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ABSTRACT 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are generating much interest both in 
academia and the telecommunication industries. The principal attractions of 
MANETs are related to the ease with which they can be deployed due to their 
infrastructure-Iess and decentralized nature. For example, unlike other wireless 
networks, MANETs do not require centralized infrastructures such as base 
stations, and they are arguably more robust due to their avoidance of single 
point of failures. Interestingly, the attributes that make MANETs attractive as 
a network paradigm are the same phenomena that compound the challenge of 
designing adequate security schemes for these innovative networks. 
One of the challenging security problems is the issue of certificate revocation 
in MANETs where there are no on-line access to trusted authorities. In wired 
network environments, when certificat es are to be revoked, certificate authorities 
(CAs) add the information regarding the certificat es in question to certificate 
revocation lists (CRLs) and post the CRLs on accessible œpositories or distribute 
them to relevant entities. In purely ad hoc networks, there are typically no access 
to centralized repositories or trusted authorities; therefore the conventional method 
of certificate revocation is not applicable. 
Another challenging MANET security problem is the issue of secure routing 
in the presence of selfish or adversarial entities which selectively drop packets they 
agreed to forward; and in so doing these selfish or adversarial entities can disrupt 
the network traffic and cause various communication problems. 
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In this thesis, we present two security protocols we developed for addressing 
the above-mentioned MANET security needs. The first proto col is a decentralized 
certificate revocation scheme which allows the nodes within a MANET to have full 
control over the pro cess of certificate revocation. The scheme is fully contained 
and it does not rely on any input from centralized or external entities such as 
trusted CAs. The second proto col is a secure MANET routing scheme we named 
Robust Source Routing (RSR). In addition to providing data origin authentication 
services and integrity checks, RSR is able to mitigate against intelligent, colluding 
malicious agents which selectively drop or modify packets they are required to 
forward. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Les réseaux ad hoc mobiles (ou MANETs, l'acronyme du terme anglais 
"mobile ad hoc networks") suscitent beaucoup d'intérêt dans le milieu académique 
et dans l'industrie des télécommunications. Leurs points les plus intéressants 
ont trait à la facilité avec laquelle ils peuvent être mis en service, vu leur nature 
décentralisée et sans infrastructure. Par exemple, les MANETs ne nécessitent 
pas d'infrastructures centralisées telles des stations de base. De plus, on peut les 
supposer plus robustes vu qu'ils contournent le problème de l'échec à un point 
unique. De façon intéressante, ce sont ces mêmes attributs des MANETs, qui 
les rendent attrayants comme paradigme de réseau, qui ajoutent au défi de la 
conception d'algorithmes de sécurité adéquats pour ceux-ci. 
Un de ces défis est le problème de sécurité de la révocation de certificats dans 
les MANETs où il n'y a pas d'accès en ligne à des autorités de confiance. Dans 
le contexte des réseaux avec fils, quand des certificats doivent être révoqués, les 
autorités de certificats (CAs) ajoutent l'information concernant les certificats en 
question à des listes de révocation (CRLs) et affichent les CRLs à des endroits 
accessibles à cet effet ou les distribuent aux entités appropriées. Pour les réseaux 
purement ad hoc, il n'y a typiquement pas de réserve ou d'entité de confiance 
centralisés. Par conséquent, la méthode conventionnelle de révocation de certificat 
n'est pas applicable. 
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Un autre défi est le problème de la sécurité de l'acheminement de paquets 
en présence d'entités égoïstes ou adversaires qui, de façon sélective, ne transmet-
tent pas les paquets qu'elles ont accepté de transmettre. Ce faisant, ces entités 
peuvent perturber le trafic du réseau et causer une multitude de problèmes de 
communication. 
Dans cette thèse, nous présentons deux protocoles de sécurité que nous avons 
développés afin de satisfaire les besoins de sécurité des MANETs mentionnés 
ci-dessus. Le premier protocole est un algorithme de révocation de certificats 
décentralisé qui permet aux nœuds d'un MANET d'avoir le plein contrôle sur le 
processus de révocation de certificats. Cet algorithme est tout à fait complet en 
lui-même et ne dépend d'aucune information provenant d'entités externes ou cen-
tralisées, telles des CAs. Le deuxième protocole est un algorithme d'acheminement 
sécurisé pour les MANETs que nous avons nommé Robust Source Routing (RSR). 
En plus de fournir des services d'authentification d'origine ainsi que des contrôles 
d'intégrité, RSR peut atténuer les effets d'agents intelligents et de connivence qui, 
de façon sélective, ne transmettent pas ou modifient des paquets qu'ils devaient 
transmettre. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are autonomous collection of mobile 
nodes which communicate over relatively bandwidth constrained wireless links. 
MANETs differ from conventional wireless networks, such as cellular networks 
and IEEE 802.11 (infrastructure mode) networks, in that they are self-containing: 
. the network nodes can communicate directly with each other without reliance on 
centralized infrastructures such as base stations. Additionally, MANETs are self-
organizing and adaptive; they can therefore form and de-form on-the-fiy without 
the need for any system administration. These unique features make MANETs 
very attractive for scenarios requiring rapid network deployment, such as search 
and rescue operations. The decentralized nature of MANETs, notably the absence 
of centralized entities, and hence the avoidance of single point of failures, makes 
these network paradigms also ideal for military and commercial applications that 
require high degree of robustness. 
There are however sorne challenging security issues which need to be ad-
dressed before MANETs are ready for widespread commercial or military deploy-
ment. One of the core security issues is trust management. Trust is generally 
established and managed in wired and other wireless networks via centralized enti-
ties, such as certificate authorities (CAs) or key distribution centers. The absence 
of centralized entities in MANETs makes trust management a rather challenging 
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problem, primarily due to the unavailability of trusted authorities to perform nec-
essary functions such as the revocation of digital certificates. Another intriguing 
MANET security problem is the issue of secure routing in the presence of selfish 
or malicious nodes, which selectively drop packets they are required to forward; 
and in so doing, these selfish or malicious entities can cause various communication 
problems. The principal objective of this thesis is to address the above-mentioned 
MANET security issues. 
1.1 Contributions of the thesis 
The contributions of this thesis are the following: 
1. A localized certificate revocation scheme which allows the nodes within 
a MANET to revoke certificat es in a sec ure way, such that protection is 
provided against wrongful revocation of well-behaving nodes' certificat es 
through malicious accusations. We evaluate the scheme via: 
(a) A security analysis 
(b) A communication complexity analysis and 
( c) Simulation assessments 
2. A robust, secure routing protocol for adversarial MANET environments that 
are likely to contain intelligent malicious or selfish entities which selectively 
drop or modify packets they agreed to forward. We assess the proto col via: 
(a) Analyses and 
(b) Simulation evaluations 
3. A review and analysis of the cryptographie tools that are currently used in 
MANET security schemes. 
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4. A review of the state of art of MANET security. 
5. A comprehensive review of the state of art of MANET routing security. 
1.2 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter one overviews sorne of the 
distinguishing features of MANETs, highlights the security issues the thesis 
addresses and summarizes the contributions of the thesis. Chapter two contains a 
review of the cryptographie tools that are currently utilized in MANET security 
schemes; this chapter also contains overviews of existing MANET security schemes. 
Chapter three highlights the routing approaches in MANETs and provides a 
comprehensive review of the state of art of MANET routing security. Chapters 
four and five formalize the research problems the thesis addresses, analyze the 
existing security proposaIs and justify the needs for the security protocols we 
developed. Chapters six and seven present overviews, detailed design and analyses 
of our protocols. The final chapter contains concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Review of the state of the art of MANET security 
The security requirements of MANETs are similar to that of other networks. 
They can be briefly summarized as follows: 
• Access control: The need to restrict access of network resources to legitimate 
authorized entities. 
• Authentication: Guarantee of the authenticity of the network peers and 
traffic source; that is, provides sorne assurance that a given network node 
is actually who it daims to be, and that any given network traffic actually 
originated from the source it purports to originate from. 
• Integrity: Accounts for whether a given data has been modified in transit 
from its source to the destination. 
• Confidentiality: Provide assurance that data in its un-encrypted form will be 
restricted to legitimate entities which have the authority to access the data. 
• Availability: Network resources should be available to authorized entities 
without excessive delays. 
Security solutions proposed for addressing access control, authentication, 
integrity and confidentiality services for MANETs utilize the following technolo-
gies: symmetric-key cryptography, digital certificates, and threshold public-key 
cryptography. In this chapter, we present a survey of proposed security solutions 
which employ these technologies. 
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2.1 Symmetric-key based solutions 
We categorized the existing symmetric-key based security schemes for Wireless 
LAN (local area networks) into two categories: (1) IEEE 802.11 related standards 
and (2) other symmetric-key based proposaIs. 
2.1.1 IEEE 802.11 related standards 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol is perhaps the most widely 
known symmetric-key based wireless network security scheme. WEP is the security 
mechanism incorporated in IEEE 802.11 WLAN [54]. WEP utilizes a secret key k, 
shared by all the communicating peers to secure data traffic. When anode needs 
to send a message M to a network peer ni, it first compute a CRC-32 checksum 
on M, denoted as c( M). c( M) is then concatenated with M to give the plaintext 
P = (M, c(M)). Next, a 24-bit initialization vector (IV) v is selected, and the RC4 
stream cipher along with the secret key k and v are used to generate a keystream, 
denoted as RC4(v, k). Finally, the plaintext Pis exclusive-or with RC4(v, k) to 
pro duce the ciphertext C = P E9 RC4(v, k), which is transmitted along with v, 
to ni. To decrypt the ciphertext C, the reverse operation is performed; that is, 
the keystream RC4(v, k) is generated and the decrypted plaintext P' is obtained 
by the following operation: P' = (C E9 RC4(v, k)). P' is equal to P, since 
P' = C E9 RC4(v, k) = (P E9 RC4(v, k)) E9 RC4(v, k) = P. The recipient can then 
verify the checksum by splitting P' in the form (M', c') and check whether c( M') 
matches the received checksum d. 
WEP has been proven to be insecurej consequently, the IEEE 802.11i [57] 
standard was developed as a replacement. IEEE 802.1li defines the Temporal 
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Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP). 
A brief description of each is outlined below. 
TKIP: was designed as a short term replacement for WEP. The overall encryp-
tion pro cess for TKIP is similar to that of WEP, but TKIP has the following 
enhancements. 
• Employs a Message Integrity Code (MIC): Instead of utilizing a CRC 
checksum-which offers very little protection against adversarial modification-
for integrity checks, TKIP employs a light weight MIC l called Michael [39]. 
Michael is a key hashing function which employs a 64-bit key to pro duce a 
64-bit message digest for input data of any given length. 
• Longer encryption key: TKIP, like WEP, uses the RC4 encryption algorithm. 
However, as opposed to WEP which accepts encryption keys of length as 
short as 40 bits, TKIP requires a 128-bit key. 
• Frequent key change: TKIP stipulates that every packet must be encrypted 
with a new encryption key which has not been used previously. The per-
packet encryption keys are generated by a key mixing function which takes 
as input a base key, the node's MAC address and the packet sequence 
number, and outputs a 128-bit packet encryption key. The base key can be a 
pre-shared secret or an authentication key. 
1 MIC is commonly referred to as Message Authentication Codes (MAC); how-
ever, since IEEE 802 designated the acronym MAC for Media Access Control, MIC 
is used here instead. 
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• Longer IV: TKIP requires a 48-bit IV: twice the length of that of a WEP IV. 
• Optional key management provision: TKIP has two modes of authentication: 
pre-shared secrets or IEEE 802.1X [55] based authentication. 802.1X is 
an IEEE standard for port-based authentication, access control and key 
management. TKIP as the framework for utilizing 802.1X for authentication 
and key management. 
CCMP: is IEEE long term security solution for wireless LAN. CCMP provides 
stronger security than TKIP. It has the following features: 
• Entails a strong cryptographie algorithm: CCMP utilizes AES [87] in 
Counter mode with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode [118]. CCM mode involves two 
techniques: Counter mode (CTR mode) [33] for confidentiality protection 
and Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) [86] 
for integrity protection. Consequently, the same 128-bit cryptographie key is 
used for confidentiality and integrity protection. 
• No need for per-paeket keys: The use of AES eliminated the need for 
frequent key changes. 
• 48-bit IV: Like TKIP, CCMP employs a 48-bit IV to provide protection 
against replay. 
• Optional key management provision: As is the case with TKIP, CCMP also 
has the framework to use 802.1X for key management. 
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2.1.2 Other symmetric-key based proposaIs 
Stajano and Anderson [110] proposed the idea of using imprinting to set up 
secure transient association between peers in an ad hoc network. Imprinting is a 
biological phenomenon; the example used in [110] is a new-born, for example a 
duckling emerging from it's egg, recognizes as its mother the first moving object 
it sees that makes a sound, irrespective of what it looks like. The comparison is 
made with a device-whose egg is a shrink-wrapped box enclosing it as it cornes 
out of the factory-will recognize as its owner the first entity that sends it a secret 
key. The authors further recommended that the medium of physical electrical 
contact be used to transfer the secret keys during the imprinting phase. 
Balfanz et al [7] proposed an extension of Stajano and Anderson" Duckling" 
model [110] that allows the exchange of secret cryptographic information via 
speciallocation-limited side channels. The secret information can then be used to 
authenticate key exchange protocols utilize to set up session keys or other keying 
material on the wireless peers. The authors assert that the information transfer 
over the location-limited channel can be used instead of digital certificates for 
authentieation; therefore negating the need for global public key infrastructure 
(PKI) and CAs. 
2.2 Digital certificate based proposaIs 
Symmetrie-key cryptography has much lower computational overhead com-
pared to other cryptographie technologies. The big drawback of symmetric-key 
cryptography is that key management can be quite tedious sinee the secret keys 
need to be exchanged over sec ure channels. Diffie and Hellman in their seminal 
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paper entitled "New Directions in Cryptography," [32] presented the concept of 
public-key cryptography which offers an effective solution to the key exchange 
problem associated with symmetric-key cryptography. Public-key cryptography, 
also commonly referred to as asymmetric-key cryptography, involves key pairs 
where the private key is kept secret and the associated public key is made public. 
The private keys are used for decrypting or signing data whereas the public keys 
are utilized for encrypting or verifying signatures. As an example, if Alice has a 
message she wishes to send to Bob and she wants Bob to be able to determine 
whether or not the message has been modified, and be able to verify that the 
message indeed came from her; Alice can sign the message with her private key 
and attach her public-key to the message before sending it to Bob. When Bob 
receives the message, he can verify the signature using the attached public key. 
If the signature verification fails, this is strong evidence that the message was 
modified while it was transmitted from Alice to Bob. However Bob will not be 
able to affirm that the message indeed came from Alice because the exchange is 
susceptible to impersonation attack2 since an adversary (Eve) can intercept the 
message, changes it, then signs it, attaches her public key and sends the modified 
message to Bob. When Bob receives the message, if there were no transmission 
error, the signature verification will succeed; Bob would therefore be fooled in 
believing that the message came from Alice, when in fact it was sent by EVE. 
2 Also referred to as man in the middle attack. 
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As a solution to the possibility of impersonation attacks when public keys 
are exchanged, DifRe and Hellman introduced the idea of utilizing a central 
authority-they called a Public File-for storing public keys. If we employ this 
concept in the example ab ove , when Alice generates her key pair, she sends her 
public key to a Public File; when Bob needs to verify the signature of a message 
from Alice or encrypt a message to send to Alice, Bob can query the Public File to 
ascertain Alice's public key. The Public File Diffie and Hellman proposed, needs to 
be universally available and is likely to be plagued with performance issue. In an 
effort to prevent the performance problem associated with the Public File, Loren 
Kohnfelder invented a construct he called cerlijicate [70]. Kohnfelder defined a 
certificate as a digitally signed data record containing a name and a public key. 
Certificat es by virtue of the fact that they are digitally signed, they can be held 
by non-trusted parties and pass around from person to person. This resolved the 
performance issue associated with the Public File, since this construct negates the 
need for aIl certificates to be stored in a central direct ory. 
There are four main types of digital certificates in use today: X.509, PGP, 
SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote certificates. We give a brief description of each type 
below. 
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X.509 Certificates 
The X.509 standard [59] was developed by the International Telecommu-
nication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T). X.509 was 
originally designed to support X.50D direct ory [58] which include the specification 
for Distinguish Name (DN). A DN is a hierarchical name which can be assigned by 
sorne central global naming authority; it was intended as a means for specifying a 
person or thing uniquely. The X.509 standard delineated digital certificates to bind 
DN of a person or a device to its public key. X.509 certificates utilize a hierarchical 
trust model. In this model, there is a root Certificate Authority (CA) which issues 
certificates to delegated CAs and the CAs in turn issue certificates to end users 
or other CAs. A certificate is verified if it has not expired or revoked and there 
is a valid certificate chain traceable back to the root CA. For example, if a CA 
CA i , delegated by a root CA CAR, issued a certificate to Bob, to verify Bob's 
certificate, one needs to first ascertain that C Ai's certificate is valid, then verify 
that Bob's certificate has not expired or revoked and it was indeed issued by CAio 
This requires access to the public keys of CA i and CAR, and up-to-date certificate 
revocation information issued by CA i and CAR' 
PGP Certificates 
Pretty Good Privacy is an email and file encryption application created by 
Phil Zimmermann [133]. A PGP certificate differs from an X.509 certificate in two 
ways: 
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1. A PGP certificate binds a keyholder common name and email address to a 
public key; whereas an X.509 certificate binds a DN (distinguish name) to a 
public key. 
2. A PGP certificate uses the web-of-trust model. In this trust model, there 
is no hierarchical structure. Certificates are issued and managed by end 
users; each end user is a CA in her own right. End users can also vouch 
for other users. For example, if Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Eve and 
issued a certificate to her, Bob can vouch for Eve and get Alice to sign Eve's 
certificate. Hence a certificate can have one or several signatures. 
To verify a certificate, one need to ascertain that the certificate has not been 
revoked and find a certificate chain-associated with the given certificate-
traceable to a user that she trusts. So for example, if Alice wishes to verify 
John's certificate, if Alice does not directly trust any of the signatories of John's 
certificate, his certificate nonetheless will be accepted if it has not been revoked 
and any of the signatories of John's certificate issued certificate to a user that 
Alice trusts, or the user issued certificate to another user who Alice trusts, and 
so on. In other words, John's certificate will be verified if it has not expired 
or revoked and there is a traceable certificate chain from his certificate to the 
certificate of a user who Alice trusts. 
SPKI/SDSI Certificates 
SPKI/SDSI is a trust management scheme comprising of two frameworks: 
"Simple Public Key Infrastructure" (SPKI) [36] and "A Simple Distributed 
Security Infrastructure" (SDSI) [102]. The SPKI/SDSI standard was developed 
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by a IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) work group as an alternative to 
X.509 and PGP certificates. The primary purpose of SPKIjSDSI certificat es is 
authorization rather than authentication. SPKIjSDSI certificates bind either 
names or explicit authorizations to keys or other objects. As is the case for PGP 
certificates, SPKIjSDSI certificat es can be issued by anyone; but unlike PGP 
certificates, deterministic certificate chains are used to verify the validity of 
SPKIjun-encryptedSDSI certificates. 
Key Note Certificates 
KeyNote [10] a trust management system which evolved from a framework 
called PolicyMaker [11]. KeyNote and SPKIjSDSI certificates are similar in that 
they bind authorization or names to keys, their emphasis is on authorization rather 
than authentication, and issuing of certificat es is not restricted to hierarchical 
CAs. They differ in their mode of operation mainly in the fact that KeyNote 
certificat es contain decision code that gives explicit "yes" or "no" answer regarding 
the validity of the certificates; whereas the validation mechanism for SPKIjSDSI 
certificates requires certificate chains as input. 
2.2.1 Schemes with no preference for certificate type 
The majority of the proposed MANET security schemes involving digital 
certificat es work with any of the above certificates types. These proposaIs can be 
grouped in the following categories: 
( a) qertificate revocation is not addressed 
(b) Certificate revocation mechanism require access to on-line certificate 
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authorities (CAs) 
(c) Certificate revocation mechanism do no require access to on-line CAs. 
We present a brief overview of a selection of these schemes below. 
ProposaIs which do Dot address certificate revocatioD 
Venkatraman and Agrawal [114, 115] proposed an authentication scheme for 
ad hoc networks. This scheme relies on a cluster based architecture, where the 
network is partitioned into clusters: each cluster has an elected cluster head which 
maintains cluster membership information and acts as the certificate authority 
(CA) for its cluster. With regard to key distribution, the scheme stipulates that 
when a node joins a network, it is given a public and private system key pair. 
AIl the nodes in the network share this key pair. In Addition to the system key 
pair, each node gets a cluster key, generated by the cluster head and shared by 
aIl the nodes within a cluster. Cluster heads have aIl the above mentioned keys 
plus a unique publicjprivate key pair which is used for exchanging session keys for 
communicating peers. The scheme relies on the assumption that aIl the nodes of a 
network mutually trust each other. This scheme does not address the issue of key 
revocation. 
Eronen et al [37] proposed a trust model for ad hoc Jini services. Jini [5] is a 
Sun Microsystem technology which seeks to simplify the connection and sharing 
of network devices and services. When Jini is installed on a network device, it 
announces itself, provides information about the capabilities of the device and 
make itself available for connections from other Jini enabled devices. The trust 
model Eronen et al proposed for securing Jini services uses digital certificates for 
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authenticating Jini enabled devices and for authorizing access to Jini services. This 
scheme does not address certificate revocation. 
Messerges et al [83] presented a security design for general multihop ad hoc 
networks based on IEEE 802.15.4 [56]low-rate wireless personal area network 
standard. The design employs both symmetric and asymmetric-key cryptography. 
Elliptic curve asymmetric-key cryptography is utilized to establish symmetric 
keys on communicating peers. The symmetric keys are in turn used with AES 
[87] encryption algorithm for providing confidentiality and integrity services. This 
security design proposaI does not address the issue of certificate revocation. 
Keoh et al [67, 68] proposed a policy-based security framework to facilitate 
the establishment, evolution and management of MANETs. In this framework, 
a MANET is considered as a community, where the community doctrine is a 
specification which clearly defines the role of the participants in the community 
and the rules or policy governing their behavior. The authors defined a doctrine as 
an information model comprising the tuples (R, P, S, TK, Sig), where R denotes 
the role type of the participating user in the community; P defines a set of policies 
regulating the behavior of the participants assigned to the roles; S defines the 
constraint of the community; T K denotes the public-keys of the credential issuer; 
and Sig is the signature of the credential issuer. The security framework uses 
certificat es as the basis of a participant gaining access to a community. This 
framework does not address certificate revocation. 
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ProposaIs which require access to trusted third party 
Morogan and Muftic [84] proposed a certificate management scheme for ad 
hoc networks. The scheme assumes that periodic access to on-line CAs is available 
such that information about revoked certificates can be ascertained from CAs. 
When on-Hne access to CAs is not available, the scheme stipulates that anode 
security policy determines whether certificates can be accepted. 
Verma et al [116] presented a progressive authentication scheme. This scheme 
utilizes digital certificates as the basis for establishing partial trust, which can 
be elevated or decremented based on the behavior profile of the nodes involved. 
The scheme requires periodic access to on-line certificate authorities (CAs) to 
obtain certificate revocation information. The authors proposed two models to 
address certificate revocation for intervals when access to on-Hne CAs is not 
available. The first model is the Probabilistic Model. In this model, a newly issued 
certificate has a trust value of 1 associated with it. A distrust value p (0 < p < 1) 
is subtracted from the trust value each time that revocation information needs 
to be ascertained and on-line access to CAs is unavailable. If the trust value of 
the certificate falls below a certain threshold, anode can refuse to accept the 
certificate. When access to the CAs resumes, the trust value of certificates that 
have not been revoked will return to 1. The second model, called the Weight M odel 
can be used in conjunction with the Probabilistic Model. Both models assume 
that anode has multiple certificates which are disc10sed during the progressive 
authentication procedure. In the Weight Model, each certificate participating in 
a trust negotiation is assigned a weight. Certificates are accepted provided their 
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weight is greater than a threshold value w, where w = E~~\~r~i, such that Pi and Wi 
are the trust value and weight of certificate i, respectively. 
ProposaI which does not require access to trusted third party 
Candolin and Kari [19J presented a model for a security architecture for ad 
hoc networks operating in hostile environments. The security architecture consists 
of a trust management framework which utilizes digital certificat es as the basis of 
trust. The scheme allows the certificate of anode to be revoked if a single node 
declares that the node in question is compromised. 
2.2.2 Schemes which require PGP certificat es 
As outlined in Section 2.2, PGP certificates employs the web-of-trust trust 
mode. This model is very decentralized in nature; consequently, sorne researchers 
considers PGP certificates to be ideal for application in MANET security proto-
cols. The MANET security proposaIs which involve PGP certificates are similar 
in principle, in the sense that they embraced the methodology of certificates being 
issued and managed by end-users rather than centralized authorities. Example of 
these proposaI includes [51, 52, 12, 20J. 
2.3 Threshold cryptography based solutions 
The ide a of (k, n) threshold scheme was introduced by Shamir in [108J. 
A (k, n) threshold scheme allows a secret, for example a certificate authority 
(CA) signing key Y, to be split into n shares such that for a certain threshold 
k < n, any k components can combine and generate a valid signature; whereas 
k - 1 or fewer shares is unable to do so. Shamir threshold scheme is based on 
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polynomial interpolation. It can be summarized as follows: A dealer with a 
secret Y E Zp, where pis a prime and p > n, can divide Y into n shares by 
choosing a random polynomial f(x) with coefficients in Zp, of degree at most 
k - 1, satisfying the condition f(O) mod p = Y. The dealer then assigns a private 
share Yi = f(Xi) mod p to each participant Pi. Any k shares can be used to find 
the coefficients of the one and only polynomial f (x) of degree k - 1 which passes 
through the k points (Xl, Yd, (X2, Y2), ... , (Xk, Yk), with distinct x/s, using the 
Lagrange formula: 
k 
f(x) = L)II (x - Xj) )Yi 
i=l Ni (Xi - Xj) 
The secret Y can then be found by evaluating f(O) since Y = f(O) mod p. 
Verifiable secret sharing 
In Shamir's scheme, a misbehaving dealer can deal inconsistent shares. This 
concern can be addressed by verifiable secret sharing (VSS), introduced by Chor, 
Goldwasser, Micali and Awerbuch in 1985 [25]. VSS allows the recipients of shares 
to verify whether or not the shares are consistent. In 1987, Feldman presented 
a practical verifiable secret sharing scheme [38]. Feldman (k,n) threshold VSS 
scheme involves the following steps: 
1. The dealer chooses a random polynomial f(x) with coefficients fo, fI, ... , fk-l 
in Zq, of degree at most k - 1, such that the secret to be shared is K = 
f(O) mod q. 
2. The dealer computes the public commit ment check g/; for i = 0,1, ... , k - 1, 
broadcasts them to all the participants and sends the value Yi = f(i) mod q 
18 
secretly to participant Pi' Note that p and q are large primes such that q 
divides p - 1, and 9 E Zp of order q. 
3. Each Pi verifies whether its share is consistent by checking the following 
equation: 
k-l 
gYi ? II (glj ) il mod p 
j=O 
4. If the equation holds, Pi broadcast a message indicating that its share is 
correct; otherwise, it rejects the share and inform the others via a broadcast. 
Proactive secret sharing 
Security of (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is based on the assumption 
that throughout the entire life of the secret, an adversary will be restricted to 
compromising less that k shares. This assumption may not be realistic for active, 
persistent, mobile adversaries. Herzberg et al [44] proposed a proactive secret 
sharing scheme allowing shares to be renewed, such that knowledge of the old 
shares is useless for attacking the secret after the shares are renewed. With this 
scheme, in order to discover a secret, an attacker needs to compromise at least k 
out of n shares, within a configurable time period t (hours, days or weeks), rather 
than having the entire life of the secret to carry out the exploit. 
The basic form of Herzberg et al scheme uses Shamir secret threshold sharing 
primitive. This however only provides protection against passive adversaries which 
are unable to disrupt the predetermined proto col. For security against active 
adversaries controlling one or more of the communicating peers, verifiable secret 
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sharing must be utilized. Herzberg verifiable share renewal protocol involves the 
following steps: 
1. Each participant Pi (for i = 1, .. , k) in the threshold secret sharing scheme, 
chooses a polynomial fi(X) of at most k - 1 degree with random coefficients 
fil, ... , fik-l in Zq, such that fi(O) = O. 
2. Pi computes the public commit ment values Pij = g/;j mod p, for j = 
0, ... , k - 1, signs and broadcasts them to aIl participants; then computes 
Sij = fi(j) mod q, signs it and sends it secretly to participant Pj, for 
j = 1, ... , k such that i =1- j. 
3. ~ verifies the correctness of the shares Sji it received from the participants, 
for j = 1, ... , k such that j =1- i, by checking the equation: 
4. If the equation in step 3 above ho Ids for aIl k - 1 Sji values, ~ broadcasts a 
signed acceptance message announcing that aIl the checks were successful. 
5. If aIl the participants broadcast acceptance messages, Pi proceeds to update 
its share yit - l ) to obtain its new share yit ) by doing the following computa-
tion: 
k-l 
YY) = yY-I) + (2: Sji) mod q 
j=l 
and erases an the variables except the current share YY) 
6. If the equation in step 3 above doesn't ho Id for any of the Sji it received, Pi 
broadcasts a signed accusation against the participant(s) associated with the 
irregularities. 
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Identity-based cryptography 
Researchers ([69, 77]) have utilized identity-based cryptography in combina-
tion with threshold cryptography in the design of MANET security protocols. It 
is fitting therefore to give an overview of identity-based cryptography before we 
review the proposaIs which employ threshold cryptography. 
Shamir [108] introduced the idea of identity-based cryptosystem in 1984. In 
this cryptographic scheme, there is no need to generate a publicjprivate key pair 
and publish the public key; instead, a public key can be an arbitrary identity 
string such as an email address, IP address or any other identity info. So for 
example, if Alice wishes to send Bob an encrypted email, she does not need to 
have Bob's public key certificate; she can encrypt the email message using Bob's 
email address as the encryption key. When Bob receives Alice's email he contacts 
a trusted third party known as a Private Key Generator (PKG), provides proof 
of his identity and receives a private key which allows him to decrypt messages 
encrypted using his email address as the encryption key. 
An identity-based encryption scheme consists of four randomized algorithm: 
Setup: generates system parameters and a master-key. The system parameters 
include a description of the finite message space M and the ciphertext space C. 
These parameters can be publicly known but it is necessary that only the private 
key generator (PKG) knows the master-key. 
Extract: uses the master-key to generate the private key corresponding to a public 
key identity string. 
Encrypt: encrypts messages using the public key identity string. 
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Decrypt: decrypts messages using the corresponding private key. 
Shamir presented an actual identity-based cryptosystem in his 1984 paper 
[108]; however, Boneh and Franklin [14] demonstrated the first provable secure 
identity-based encryption scheme. We give an overview of Boneh-Franklin identity-
based encryption scheme below. 
The security of Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption scheme is based on 
the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption. The BDH problem is as follows. 
Let G1 , G2 be two groups of prime order q. Let ê : G1 X G1 -+ G2 be a bilinear 
map (a map ê : G1 x G1 -+ G2 is bilinear if ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all P, Q E G1 
and all a, b E Z) and let P be a generator of G1. The BDH problem in (G1G2 , ê) 
is: given (P, aP, bP, cP) for sorne a, b, c E Z~, compute W = ê(P, p)abc E G2 • 
The four algorithms which constitute Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryp-
tion scheme is as follows: 
Setup: Let IG be a BDH parameter generator satisfying the BDH assumption 
and let k be a security parameter given to the setup algorithm. Setup proceeds in 
the following steps. 
Step 1: Run IGon input k to generate two prime order groups G1 , G2 of or der q 
and a bilinear map ê : G1 x G1 -+ G2 . Choose an arbitrary P E G1 
Step 2: Pick a random s E Z~ and set P pub = sP 
Step 3: Choose four cryptographie hash functions Hl : {0,1}* -+ Gi, where Gi 
denotes the set Gi = G1 \ {O} where 0 is the identity element in the group G1. 
H2 : G2 -+ {a, l}n for sorne n, H3 : {O, l}n x {O, l}n -+ Z~ and 
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H4 : {a, l}n -+ {a, l}n. The message space is M = {a, l}n. The ciphertext space is 
C = Gr x {a, l}n. The system parameters are 
params = (Gl , G2 , ê, n, P, Ppub, Hl, H2 ). The master-key is s E Z;. 
Extract: Given a string ID E {a, 1}*, the algorithm does: 
(1) computes QID = Hl(ID) E Gr and 
(2) sets the private key dID to be SQID where s is the master-key. 
Encrypt: To encrypt M E {a, l}n under the public key ID, do the following: 
(1) compute QID = Hl(ID) E Gi, 
(2) choose a random Œ E {a, 1 ln, 
(3) set r = H3(Œ, M), and 
(4) set the ciphertext to be C = (rP, Œ EB H2(9ID)' M EB H4 (Œ)), 
where 9ID = ê(QID, Ppub) E G2 
Decrypt: Let C = (U, V, W) be a ciphertext encrypted using a public key ID. If 
U (j. Gr reject the ciphertext. To decrypt C using the private key dID E Gr do: 
(1) compute V EB H2 (ê(dID , U)) = Œ, 
(2) compute WEB H4 (Œ) = M, 
(3) set r = H3(Œ, M). Test that U = rP. If not reject the ciphertext. 
( 4) Output M as the decryption of C. 
2.3.1 Proposed security schemes involving threshold cryptography 
A notable application of threshold secret sharing is threshold digital sig-
natures. In a threshold digital signature scheme, a signing key is divided into 
n shares. Any k share holders can collaborate to compute a valid signature by 
combining the partial signatures each of the k participants generated. The partial 
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signatures computed by applying the shares Si to a message M are public values; 
and therefore they can be transmitted over insecure channels. Robust threshold 
digital signature schemes have been proposed for both RSA and discrete log based 
digital signature algorithms [109, 41]. 
The idea of utilizing threshold cryptography to distribute trust in ad hoc 
networks was proposed by Zhou and Haas in [131]. The authors articulated that 
the challenges associated with key management services in ad hoc networks can be 
resolved by distributing CA's duties amongst the network nodes. For example, a 
CA signing key can be partitioned into n shares and distributed to n nodes. Any 
k of the n nodes could then collaborate to sign and issue valid digital certificates; 
whereas a coalition of k - 1 or less nodes would not be unable to do so. The issue 
of certificate revocation was not addressed in this proposaI. 
Kong et al [73] presented a self-initialization protocol for handling dynamic 
node membership, such that new nodes can be initialized by k neighbors, and in 
so doing, the new nodes are given shares of the CA signing key, so that they can 
participate in the pro cess of issuing certificates. The protocol stipulates that in 
the bootstrapping phase of the network, each node ni is given valid certificate and 
the associated private key, along with a secret share Si of the CA signing key. Any 
given Si can be used in collaborate with k - 1 other Si values to generate valid 
certificates. The proto col self-initialization scheme allows anode to compute a 
partial secret share of its Si value and transmit it to an uninitialized node, such 
that the uninitialized node j can compute its secret share Sj, using Lagrange 
interpolation (Section 2.3), provided it obtained k partial secret shares. The 
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protocol is built upon Shamir's threshold scheme and it do es not involve verifiable 
secret sharing. It however, employs Herzberg et al proactive secret sharing 
scheme for protection against persistent adversaries. With regards to the issue of 
certificate revocation, the authors specified that when a certificate is deemed to 
be compromised, a signed counter-certificate is flooded over the network to denote 
that the given certificate has been revoked. 
Luo et al [80, 72] presented an extensions of Kong et al work [73]. The 
proposaI involves a framework for parallel share updates, and an improved 
certificate revocation mechanism. The parallel share updates builds on Herzberg 
et al scheme [44]. However, unlike the latter, which requires each node to colle ct 
inputs from all the other nodes before its new share can be computed, the authors 
stipulated that firstly a coalition of k nodes update their shares using Herzberg 
et al methodology; then the coalition of k nodes can update the shares of the 
remaining nodes utilizing the self-initialization scheme employs in [73]. This 
therefore allows parallelization, and consequently a more efficient share update 
process. The certificate revocation mechanism can be briefly described as follows: 
Each node ni maintains a certificate revocation list (CRL). An entry in the 
CRL consists of an accused node's ID and a list of the node's accusers. If a 
node's accuser list contains less than k legitimate accusers, the node is marked 
as "suspect". Otherwise, the node in question is considered by node ni to be 
misbehaving or compromised, and is marked as "convicted". Anode can also 
designate a neighboring node nj as been "convicted" if by its observation ni deems 
nj to be misbehaving or compromised. In such case, ni broadcasts an accusation 
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against nj' When a node ni receives an accusation against any given node, ni 
first checks if the accuser is a convicted node in its CRL; if it is, the accusation 
is discarded; otherwise, it updates its CRL with the relevant information. When 
anode is delineated as being convicted, it is removed from aIl accuser list. A 
convicted no de is re-classified as being suspected if its number of accusers falls 
below k. 
Zhou et al [132] developed a fault-tolerant secure on-line certification author-
ity called COCA. COCA utilizes multiple servers and its security is based on the 
assumption that at most t of 3t + 1 servers can be compromised. Every client 
request sent to the COCA system is processed by a quorum of 2t + 1 servers and 
every certificate is replicated on multiple servers. COCA is an implementation of 
the threshold secret sharing concepts Zhou and Haas proposed [131]. COCA also 
employs pro active secret sharing to provide protection against persistent adversary. 
Khalili et al [69] presented a key distribution scheme which utilizes identity-
based and threshold cryptography. In this scheme, at the time of network for-
mation, a master key is shared amongst n participating nodes. The shares of the 
master key is then used to generate a master public key PK for an identity-based 
cryptosystem. This setup allows the network nodes (current and future) to use 
their identities as their public keys. Anode can acquire the private key corre-
sponding to its identity by obtaining and combining shares from any k of the 
n nodes which has a share of the master key. This proposaI is similar in spirit 
to that of Zhou and Haas [131] except that it uses threshold cryptography to 
distribute the private key generation service (PKG) rather than the certificate 
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authority (CA) services. This approach eliminates the necessity to distribute the 
public keys of the MANET nodes since their known identities (IP address, email 
address, etc) is used as their public keys. 
Wang et al [117] proposed a self-managed heterogeneous certification scheme. 
This scheme employs threshold cryptography to distribute CA services amongst 
multiple nodes. It differs from the previously mentioned schemes in the following 
ways: (1) It allows multiple heterogeneous distributed CA systems to coexists in a 
MANET; whereas, the schemes reviewed above facilitate a single distributed CA 
system per MANET. (2) It requires each node in a network to have a physically 
un forgeable identification (example: an ID recorded in a smart card) as proof that 
it received an original certificate. This provides a measure of protection against 
Sybil attack [34] where nodes forge their identity and acquire multiple certificates. 
(3) It outlines a pro cess which allows communicating peers to find a CA system 
they both trust. 
Lehane et al [77] presented an implementation of shared threshold RSA key 
generation proto col which allows nodes to collaborate and distributively generate 
RSA key pairs. The proto col utilizes two separate techniques for generating a 
public key and the shares for corresponding private key: it employs Boneh-Franklin 
[13] techniques for generating a shared public key, and Catalano et al [21] protocol 
for computing inverses over a shared secret modulus to derived the shares for the 
corresponding private key. The protocol was implemented and ran on a wireless 
local area network consisting of two 500 Mhz laptops and a 200 Mhz Compaq 
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IPAQ pocket PC. The implementation results indicated that a 512 bit RSA key, an 
average took 2.5 minutes to generate. 
Yi and Kravets [123] presented a composite key management framework which 
combines the ideas of a distributed (virtual) CA (using threshold cryptography) 
and a non-hierarchical certificate trust model such as PGP web-of-trust model 
[133]. The distributed CA is similar to that of Zhou and Haas [131] except that 
virtual CA role is restricted to a small number of nodes. The remaining nodes 
(the non-virtual CA nodes) individually issue and manage certificates in a similar 
manner as Capkun et al [20] scheme. The virtual CA-by virtue of the fact that it 
is more trusted than the non-virtual CA nodes-is used to increase the confidence 
level of a web-of-trust certificate chain. 
Xu and Iftode [121] proposed a locality driven key management architecture. 
The architecture envisions a MANET as a group of interacting subnetworks. 
Each subnetwork establishes a distributed CA using threshold cryptography. A 
distributed CA issues certificates to the nodes in its subnetwork and provides 
public key authentication services for its community. The distributed CAs of the 
different subnetworks build trust relations (using threshold cryptography) with 
each other. These trust relations are utilized to authenticate "foreign" certificates 
issued by other CAs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Review of the state of the art of MANET routing security 
In an ad hoc network, aH the nodes may not be within the transmission range 
of each other; hence, nodes are often required to forward network traffie on behalf 
of other nodes. Consider for example the scenario in Fig 3-1, if node S sends data 
to node D, which is three hops away, the data traffie will get to its destination 
only of A and B forward it. 
o o 
o 
o 
Figure 3-1: Multihop scenario 
D 
o 
o 
The pro cess of forwarding network traffic from source to destination is termed 
routing. 
3.1 Overview of routing approaches in MANETs 
There are two general categories of MANET routing protocols: topology-based 
and position-based routing protocols. We present a brief overview of each group 
below. Before proceeding, it is fitting to list sorne desirable qualitative properties 
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of MANET routing protocols. This list is adopted from an Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) MANET Working Group memo [26]. 
• Loop-free: It is desirable that routing proto cols prevent packets from circling 
around in a network for arbitrary time periods. 
• Demand-based operation: In order to utilize network energy and bandwidth 
more efficiently, it is desirable that MANET routing algorithms adapt to the 
network traffic pattern on a demand or need basis rather than maintaining 
routing between aH nodes at aH time. 
• Proactive operation: This is the fiip-side of demand-based operation. In cases 
where the additionallatency-which demand-based operations incur-may 
be unacceptable, if there are adequate bandwidth and energy resources, 
proactive operations may be desirable in these situations. 
• "Sleep" period operation: It may be necessary-for reasons such as the need 
for energy conservation-for nodes to stop transmitting or receiving signaIs 
for arbitrary time periods. Routing proto cols should be able to accommodate 
sleep periods without adverse consequences. 
• Security: It is desirable that routing proto cols provide security mechanisms 
to prohibit disruption or modification of the protocol operations. 
3.1.1 Position-based routing protocols 
Position-based routing proto cols employ nodes' geographical position to make 
routing decisions. In order to utilize a position-based routing protocol, anode 
must be able to ascertain the geographical position of itself and that of an the 
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nodes it wishes to communicate with. This information is typically obtained via 
Global Positioning System (GPS) and location services. 
The emphasis of this thesis is on topology-based rather than position-based 
routing; however, we give a brief overview below of basic position-based routing 
algorithms. 
Greedy 
The Greedy routing algorithm was developed by G. Finn [40]. In the greedy 
forwarding approach, a node selects for the next hop, the node that is closest to 
the destination of the packet. In Figure 3-2, if S has data traffic to send to D 
which is outside of its transmission range, greedy forwarding dictates that S sends 
the traffic through B since B is the node within S transmission range which is 
closest to the destination node D. 
A 
e ____ s 
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Figure 3-2: Greedy forwarding 
Compass 
The Compass routing algorithm was developed by Kranakis et al [74]. In the 
Compass routing scheme, anode S which has data traffic to send to a destination 
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node D, forwards the traffie to its neighbor N whieh has the smallest angle 
LNSD, where N is a neighboring node to the forwarding node Sand D is the 
destination. So for example in Figure 3-3, S forwards the traffie for D to A 
sinee the angle LAS D is smaller than any other angle LN S D where N is anode 
within S transmission range. Notably, Stojmenovic and Lin [111] showed that the 
Compass algorithm is not loop-free . 
. I~ 
------.----------- --------------- ·0 /~ 
• B 
Figure 3-3: Compass forwarding 
Randomized compass 
The Randomized Compass routing algorithm [15] is a variation of the Com-
pass algorithm whieh avoids loops with random deeisions. Consider a line between 
anode S and a destination node D. The Random Compass forwarding approaeh 
ehooses the next hop for a paeket by randomly seleeting between the nodes Ni and 
Nj whieh has the smallest angle LNiSD and LNjSD between the imaginary line 
N S (between anode N and the forwarding node S) and S D, above and below the 
imaginary line SD, respectively. 80 for example in Figure 3-3, node S would ran-
domly select node A or B for forwarding paekets to D sinee LAS D is the smallest 
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angle (between a li ne connecting S and anode that is within S transmission range, 
and the line SD) above the line SD and LBSD is the smallest angle below the 
line SD. 
Most Forwarded within Radius (MFR) 
Takagi and Kleinroc proposed MFR [112]. Consider an imaginary line SD 
between anode S and a destination node Di in MFR forwarding, S forwards 
data traffic for D to a node A which maximizes the progress along the imaginary 
line SD. Ais therefore the node which minimizes the dot product DA . DS. 
80 in Figure 3-4, S forwards packets for D to A since A is the node within S 
transmission range which provides the most progress along the line S D. 
~~---'----t---------' ·.D 
Figure 3-4: MFR forwarding 
3.1.2 Topology-based routing protocols 
There are two major categories of topology-based MANET routing protocols: 
On-demand and proactive protocols. In the section, we briefly describe sorne of the 
more prominent existing MANET topology-based routing protocols. We commence 
with proactive protocols. 
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Proactive protocols 
Proactive protocols are also referred to as periodic protocols. The most 
prominent proactive MANET routing proto col is Dynamic Destination-Sequenced 
Distance-Vector Routing (DSDV) [95]. DSDV utilizes the classical Distributed 
Bellman-Ford Distance-Vector algorithm [8, 62]. In distance-vector algorithms, 
each no de i, for each destination x, maintains a set of distances {dt}, where j 
ranges over the neighbors of i. The distances are typically interpreted as the 
number of hops from i to x via the given neighbor j. Node i designates a neighbor 
k as the next hop for a packet if dfk equals minj { dfj}. The succession of the next-
hop chosen in this manner leads to x along the shortest path. In or der to keep 
the estimated distances up-to-date, each node monitors the costs of its out-going 
links and periodically broadcasts to each of its neighbors, its current estimate 
of the short est path to aIl other nodes in the network. It is weIl known that the 
Distance-Vector routing algorithm outlined above is not loop-free [23]. The main 
cause of routing loop formation is the fact that nodes choose their next-hops 
in a distributed fashion based on information which may be stale and therefore 
incorrect. DSDV avoids the Distance-Vector looping problem by tagging each 
routing distance info with a sequence number so nodes can quickly distinguish new 
routes from st ale ones and consequently avoiding the formation of routing loops. 
In DSDV routing, each MANET node maintains a routing table which is use 
for making routing decisions. A DSDV routing table lists aIl available destinations 
and the number of hops to each. Each routing table entry is tagged with a 
sequence number originated from the destination node. DSDV protocol requires 
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each network node to advertise (via broadcasting or multicasting) to each of its 
current neighbors, its own routing table. Additionally, each node is required to 
transmit updates immediately when significantly new information is available. The 
routing information data anode broadcasts contains a new sequence number and 
and the following info for each new route: 
• The destination's address; 
• The number of hops from the source to the destination; and 
• The sequence number of the information received regarding the destination, 
as originally stamped by the destination. 
The MANET nodes use the advertised routing tables info and the transmitted 
updates to update their routing tables; which is utilized by the Distance-Vector 
algorithm outlined above to determine the next-hop for a packet. 
On-demand protocols 
On-demand protocols are also referred to as reactive protocols. Unlike 
proactive proto cols which seeks to maintain routes to all destination in a MANET, 
on-demand proto cols establish routes on a per need basis. There are a larger 
collection of existing on-demand protocols compare to proactive protocols. We 
present brief description of sorne of the more widely known on-demand protocols 
below. 
DSR 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) was developed by Johnson and Maltz [61]. Its 
basic operation is as follows: when anode S has a packet to send to a destination 
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D, S checks its routing cache for an entry containing a path to D. If there is no 
such entry, S broadcasts a routing request (RREQ) packet containing the initiator 
address, a unique request id , the destination address and a route record field. The 
latter is used to accumulate the sequence of hops the RREQ packet takes as it 
propagates through the network. When a node ni receives a RREQ packet, if it 
has previously seen a RREQ packet with the same initiator address and request id, 
it dis cards it; otherwise, if ni is not the destination and its routing cache does not 
contain a valid path to D, it records the initiator address and request id, appends 
its address to the route record and forwards the packet. If ni is the destination, it 
returns a copy of the route record in a route reply (RREP) packet to the initiator. 
If ni is not the destination but it knows of a path to D, it sends a copy of the 
path in a RREP packet back to the source of the RREQ packet. On receiving the 
RREP packet, S records the ascertained route to D in its routing cache, writes the 
route in the source route field of the packet header and sends the packet to the 
node which is the next hop in the path to D. The intermediate nodes on the path 
to D will likewise use the route recorded in the source route field of the packet 
header to determine the address of the next hop they should forward the packet to, 
until the packet eventually reaches the intended destination. 
SSA 
Signal Stability based Adaptive Routing (SSA) was developed by Dube et 
al [35]. SSA utilizes signal strength and stability of individual MANET nodes 
as routing selection criteria. The rational being (in the authors' view) that links 
which exhibit the strongest signal for the maximum amount of time leads to 
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longer-lived routes and less route maintenance. In SSA routing, a source S sends 
out a route discovery request wh en it has data to send to a destination D that is 
not in its routing table. S broadcasts the route request to aIl its neighbors. Each 
neighboring node propagates the route request if it received it over a strong chan-
nel and the request has not been propagated previously. A channel is characterized 
as strong or weak based on the average signal strength at which the packets are 
exchanged between the nodes at either end of the channel. The route search packet 
continues to traverse the network until it reaches the destination, and it stores the 
address of each intermediate node it traversed. The first route search packet which 
arrives at the destination D is selected and a route reply packet is constructed 
and returned to S using the selected route. Each intermediate node in the selected 
route, on receiving the route reply packet, includes the new next-hop, destination 
pair in its routing table. 
ABR 
C-H Toh developed the Associativity-Based Routing (ABR) [113]. ABR 
utilizes the observation that a mobile node's association with its neighbor changes 
as it migrates and its transiting period can be identified by the associativity 
"ticks". Associativity ticks are updated by the mobile node's data-link protocol 
which periodically transmits beacons identifying itself and updates its associativity 
ticks in accordance with the mobile nodes in its neighborhood. A mobile node 
exhibits high associativity ticks (high association stability) with its neighbors 
when it is in a state of low mobility. Conversely, a state of high mobility is 
associated with low associativity ticks. In ABR routing, anode S which desires 
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a route to a destination D broadcasts a broadcast query (BQ) message which 
propagates through the MANET in search of anode which has a route to the 
given destination. When an intermediate node ni receives a BQ message it has not 
previously seen, ni appends its address, associativity ticks with its neighbors, its 
relaying load, link propagation delay and its hop count to the appropriate fields of 
the BQ, and broadcasts the BQ to its neighbors. The next succeeding intermediate 
node will then erase its upstream node's neighbors' associativity ticks entries and 
retain only those concerning itself and its upstream nodes. When the destination 
node D receives the BQ packets, it selects a route based on the following selection 
criteria: routes consisting of nodes with higher associativity ticks has higher 
preference even over routes with sm aller number of hops. For routes with equal 
number of associativity ticks, the route with the smaller hop count is selected. 
If the routes have the equal number of associativity ticks and hop counts, one of 
the route is randomly selected. The selected route is used to construct a REPL Y 
packet and returned to the source S via the selected route. The intermediate nodes 
on the route from D to S will consequently mark their routes to D as valid and 
subsequently inactivate aIl other possible routes to D. 
TORA 
Temporally-Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) was developed by Park 
and Corson [92]. It is a highly adaptive multipath, loop-free, distributed routing 
algorithm which was designed for highly dynamic MANET environments. A 
key design concept of TORA is the localization of routing control messages to 
a small set of nodes near the topological change. In TORA routing, each node, 
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at any given point in time has an associated ordered quintuple consisting of the 
following elements: (1) a logical time of link failure (2) the unique ID of the node 
which defined the new reference level (3) a single bit which is used to divide 
each of the unique reference level into two unique sub-Ievels (4) a propagation 
ordering parameter and (5) the unique ID of the node. Conceptually, the quintuple 
represents the height of anode defined by a reference level and a delta with 
respect to the reference level. The reference level is represented by the first three 
values of the quintuple while the last two values represent the delta. Each node 
i (other than the destination) maintains its height Hi which is initially set to 
NULL, Hi = (-, -, -, -, i). The height of the destination is always ZERO, 
HDID = (0,0,0,0, Did), where DI D represents the destination ID. In addition to 
its own height, each node maintains an height array with an entry H Ni,j for each 
of its neighbor j. Each node i also maintains a link-state array for each of its links. 
The state of a link is determined by its height Hi and H Ni and is directed from 
higher node to lower node. 
When anode requires a route to a destination D it sends out a QRY packet. 
When anode i receives a QRY packet it has not previously seen, it reacts as 
follows: (a) i rebroadcasts the QRY packet if it has no downstream links; (b) if the 
receiving node has at least one downstream link and its height is NULL, it sets its 
height to the minimum height of it non-NULL neighbors and broadcasts a UPD 
packet (which consists of a destination ID and the height of the node i which is 
broadcasting the packet); (c) if the receiving node has at least one downstream 
link and its height is non-NULL, it first compares the time the last UPD packet 
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was broadcast to the time the link over which the QRY packet arrived was active. 
If the link became active prior to the broadcasting of the UPD packet, i dis cards 
the QRY; otherwise, i broadcasts a UPD packet. When anode i receives a UPD 
packet it has not previously seen from a neighbor j, i updates the entry H Ni,j 
in its height array with the height contained in the UPD packet, then do the 
following: if its height is NULL, i sets its height to the minimum height of its non-
NULL neighbor, updates all the entries in its link-state array then rebroadcasts 
the UPD packet which contains its new height. The pro cess (broadcasting of QRY 
and UPD packets) continues until a directed acyclic graph (DAG) rooted at the 
destination (i.e. the destination is the only node with no downstream links) is 
formed. The DAG represents a route from the source S to the destination D. 
AODV 
Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing was designed by Perkins and 
Royer [96]. Its operation can be summarized as follows: Each node using AODV 
maintains a route table entry for each destination of interest. A route table entry 
contains the destination D, next hop, number of hops to D, sequence number 
of the destination and the expiration time for the route table entry. When a 
node S has a packet to send to a destination D, S checks its routing table for 
an entry containing D. as the destination with a sequence number equal to or 
greater than the last known destination sequence number of D. If there is no 
such entry, S broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet, containing the source 
address, the source sequence number, broadcast id, destination sequence number 
and hop count. The source sequence number and the broadcast id are separate 
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counters that are maintained by each node. Anode increments its broadcast id 
counter each time it constructs a new RREQ packet; whereas the node's sequence 
number counter is incremented less frequently. The destination sequence number 
is the last known sequence number of the destination. When a node ni receives a 
RREQ packet it has not previously seen, it sets up a reverse path to the source 
by recording the address of its neighbor from which it received the first copy of 
the RREQ. If ni is not the destination and its routing table do es not contain an 
entry for D, it increments the hop count and rebroadcasts the RREQ packet to its 
neighbors. If ni however is the destination or if its routing table contains an entry 
with D as its destination with a destination sequence number that is equal to or 
greater than the destination sequence number in the RREQ packet, it constructs a 
route reply (RREP) packet and unicasts it to the neighboring node it received the 
RREQ from. An RREP packet contains the source address, destination address, 
destination sequence number, hop count and lifetime. When an intermediate node 
receives a RREP packet, it updates its routing table with the information the 
RREP contains, then unicasts it to the neighbor it received the first copy of the 
associated RREQ packet. The pro cess continues until the RREP packet gets to S. 
Scan now forward its packet to the next hop on the path to D. 
3.2 Sec ure MANET routing proposaIs 
The protocols we reviewed in Section 3.1.2 were designed for non-adversarial 
environments, where the node within a network are non-malicious, unselfish and 
well-behaving. The reality however is that in any network, there are likely to be 
malicious or selfish, miss-behaving nodes which have intentions of disrupting the 
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routing proto col. Security mechanisms are therefore necessary to mitigate against 
these eventualities. This section reviews sorne of the routing security schemes 
which have been proposed to address the security shortcomings of these protocols. 
For the purpose of the review we categorized the existing secure MANET routing 
proposaIs into the following categories: basic routing security schemes, trust-based 
routing schemes, incentive-based schemes and schemes which employs detection 
and isolation mechanisms. Below, we briefly describe a selection of schemes which 
fall in these categories. 
3.2.1 Basic routing security schemes 
The routing schemes which fall in this category provide authentication services 
which guard against modification and replaying of routing control messages, but 
they do not attempt to provide solutions for issues such as the dropping of packets 
by selfish or malicious nodes. We commence the review with one of the earlier 
proposaIs. 
Binkley and Trost presented an authenticated link-Ievel ad hoc routing proto-
col [9J which was integrated into the Portland State University implementation of 
Mobiie-IPI [94J. The protocol uses ICMP router discovery message [30J to discover 
mobile-IP nodes. It extended the ICMP router discovery packet format to include 
the MAC (Media Access Control) and IP address of the sender, and authentication 
info that can be used toverify the broadcast beacon. The protocol requires nodes 
1 Mobile-IP is a network-Iayer proto col which enables a mobile node to retain a 
fixed IP address even when it changes its point of connectivity to the Internet. 
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to have shared secret keys for generating message authentication codes which are 
used to authenticate the routing control messages. 
Venkatraman and Agrawal introduced an inter-router authentication scheme 
[115J for securing AODV [96J routing proto col against external attacks (such as 
impersonation attacks, replaying of routing control messages and certain denial 
of service attacks). The scheme is based on the assumption that the nodes in the 
network mutually trust each other and it employs public key cryptography for 
providing the security services. The integrity of routing requests are ensured by 
the originating node hashing the messages and signing the resulted message digest. 
Recipients of a route request can check its authenticity and integrity by computing 
the hash of a the message using the agreed upon hash function, compare the 
computed hash with that attached to the message and verifying the signature. 
"Strong authentication" is provided for adjacent pair of nodes which transmit 
route replies. The strong authentication procedure is as follows: A no de ni sends 
a pre-reply plus a random challenge (challenge1) to a neighbor it wishes to send a 
reply. The neighbor nj which received the pre-reply generate a random challenge 
(challenge2), encrypts challenge1 with ni's public key and sends the encrypted 
challenge along with challenge2 to ni. When ni receives this message, it encrypts 
challenge2 with nj 's public key and sends the route reply along with the encrypted 
value of challenge2 to ni. This procedure is designed for detecting nodes which 
attempt to impersonate other nodes. 
Papadimitratos and Haas presented secure routing proto col (SRP) [91J. SRP 
assumes the existence of a security association between anode initiating a route 
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request query and the sought destination. The basic operation is as follows: A 
source node S initiates a route discovery by constructing and broadcasting a route 
request packet containing a source and destination address, a query sequence 
number, a random query identifier, a route record field (for accumulating the 
traversed intermediate nodes) and the message integrity codes (MIC) of the 
random query identifier, computed using HMAC [75] and the secret key shared 
between the S and the destination. Intermediate nodes relay the route request 
packet so that one or more query packet(s) arrive(s) at the destination. When 
the route requests reach the destination D, D verifies that (a) the MIC is indeed 
that of the random query identifier, and (b) the sequence number is equal to or 
greater than the last known sequence number from S. If both (a) and (b) hold, D 
constructs a corresponding route reply packet containing the source, destination, 
the accumulated route in the route record field of the request query, the sequence 
number, the random query identifier and the computed MIC of the above. D then 
sends the route reply to S using the reverse path in the route record field. When 
S receives a route reply packet it validates the info it contains and verifies the 
computed MIC. If aIl is weIl, it uses the ascertained route to communicate with D. 
Hu, Johnson and Perrig proposed the Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance 
vector routing protocol (SEAD) [47]. SEAD is a secure proactive protocol which 
is based on the design of DSDV [95]. SEAD uses one-way hash chains [76] for 
authenticating the hop count values in advertised routes and routing updates. 
For the authentication of the sender of routing update messages, SEAD allows 
authentication to be do ne using broadcast authentication mechanisms such as 
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TESLA [97], HORS [100] or TIK [48] which require the network nodes to have 
time synchronized docks. Alternatively, SEAD allows message authentication 
codes to be used to authenticate the sen der of routing update messages; however, 
this is based on the assumption that shared secret keys are established among each 
pair of nodes. 
Zapata presented Secure AODV (SAODV) [127, 128, 126]. SAODV uses two 
mechanisms to secure AODV: digital signatures to authenticate non-mutable fields 
of the routing control messages and one-way hash chains (as is the case for SEAD, 
outlined ab ove ) to sec ure hop count information. 
Hu, Perrig and Johnson proposed a routing security scheme called Ariadne 
[46] which is based on the design of DSR [61]. Ariadne uses message authentication 
code for authenticating routing control messages, and it requires time synchroniza-
tion hardware for synchronizing the release of the secret keys used for generating 
the message authentication codes. 
Sanzgiri and Dahill presented ARAN [105]. ARAN uses digital certificates 
to sec ure the routing control messages. In ARAN route discovery phase, a source 
node S constructs a route discovery packet (RDP), signs it, attaches its certificate 
and broadcasts it to its neighbors. When a node A, which is a neighbor of S, 
receives the RDP message, if it has not previously seen this message, it verifies 
the signature using the attached certificate, signs the RDP message, attaches its 
certificate and broadcasts it to its neighbors. An intermediate node B which is a 
neighbor of A, on receiving the RDP message, it validates the signature using the 
attached certificate. B then removes A's certificate and signature, records B as 
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its predecessor, signs the message and broadcasts it to its neighbors. The pro cess 
continues in this manner until a RDP message arrives at the destination D. D 
selects the first RDP message it received, uses it to construct a reply (REP) packet 
and unicasts it to S using the reverse path. Each node on the reverse path back 
to S validates its predecessor signature using the attached certificate, removes the 
signature and the certificate (if the certificate does not belong to the destination 
no de D), signs the packet, attaches its certificate and forwards the packet to the 
next-hop. EventuaUy, S should receive the REP with the route it seeks. 
Hu, Perrig and Johnson presented a mechanism caUed packet leashes for 
detecting and defending against wormhole attacks [48]. In wormhole attacks, an 
attacker receives packets at one point in a network, tunnel them to another point 
in the network and replays them into the network from that point. The authors 
proposed two types of packet leashes: geographical leashes and temporal leashes. 
Geographical leashes require anode to know its own geographical location and aU 
nodes must have loosely synchronized clocks. Whereas temporal leashes require aU 
nodes to have tightly synchronized clocks. The leash mechanisms add necessary 
fields to a packet-for example the time the packet was sent and the sender's 
geographicallocation (for geographicalleashes)-which aUows the receivers to 
validate whether anode is in its transmission range or not. The authors also 
proposed a secure broadcast scheme called TIK which can be used to secure the 
packet leash mechanisms. 
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3.2.2 Trust-based routing schemes 
The routing security schemes which fall in this category assign quantitative or 
qualitative trust values to the nodes in the network, based on observed behavior of 
the nodes in question. The trust values are then used as additional metrics for the 
routing protocols. We commence the review with one of the earlier protocols. 
Yi et al proposed a scheme called security-aware ad hoc routing (SAR) [124]. 
In SAR, nodes are categorized based on their security level. A secret group key 
is associated with each security level and it is shared amongst nodes which are 
classified at the given security level. SAR incorporates security attributes as route 
discovery parameters, such that anode can specify its preference with regards to 
the security level required for participation in the routing process. 
Yan, Zhang and Virtanen proposed a trust evaluation based security solution 
[122]. The application of this scheme to MANET routing is similar in principle to 
the design of SAR [124], in that the trust (or reputation) of anode is used as a 
routing metric wh en deciding the next hop of a packet. 
Pirzada and McDonald presented a model for trust-based communication in 
ad hoc networks [98]. In this model, each node passively observe other nodes and 
assigns quantitative values (which range from 0 to +1) to nodes based on observed 
behavior. The authors proposed an extension of DSR [61] which incorporates the 
trust model and utilizes trust as an additional routing metric. 
Nekkanti and Lee presented a trust based adaptive on demand routing proto-
col [88]. The authors articulated that the most effective way of preventing certain 
routing attacks is to totally hide certain routing information from unauthorized 
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nodes. In this regard, the main aim of their proposed scheme is to mask the rout-
ing path between a source and a destination from all other node. The scheme is 
based on AODV [96J. It stipulates that one of three possible encryption levels 
be applied to a route request packets (RREQ). The encryption levels are high 
encryption which requires a 128-bit key, low encryption which needs a 32-bit key, 
and no encryption. The security level of a node and the security level of an appli-
cation determine which encryption level is utilized. The general idea is that the 
more trustworthy anode is, the less need there is to hi de routing information from 
this node during a route discovery operation. A summary of the route discovery 
operation is as follows: A source node S which desires a route to a destination D 
constructs a RREQ packet. The RREQ has a field where the application can set 
the security level it requires. The source then utilizes the public key of the destina-
tion node D to encrypt (with the appropriate security level) the source ID field of 
the RREQ packet and broadcasts it to its neighbors. When an intermediate node 
receives a RREQ packet it has not previously seen, if it is not the destination, it 
adds its node ID to the packet, signs it then encrypts it using the the public key of 
D and broadcasts it to its neighbor. Eventually an RREQ packet should get to D. 
On receiving an RREQ packet, D verifies the signatures, decrypts the encrypted 
fields and verifies that the nodes in the path has the minimum required trust 
level. If these validation operations succeed, it constructs a route reply (RREP) 
packet and a flow-id and encrypts the RREP and the flow-id with the public keys 
of the nodes in the reverse path to S (in the order that the nodes should receive 
the RREP packet); then D signs the encrypted RREP and broadcasts it to its 
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neighbors. When an intermediate node ni receives the RREP it will attempt to 
decrypt it; if the decryption operation fails, ni discards the packet; otherwise, it 
updates its routing table, removes its part of the RREP and broadcasts it to its 
neighbor. Eventually, the RREP should get to the source S which will verify the 
signature and decrypts the RREP to ascertain the route it seeks. 
Boukerche et al proposed sec ure distributed anonymous routing proto col 
(SDAR) [16]. The main objective of SDAR is to allow trustworthy intermediate 
nodes to participate in routing without compromising their anonymity. SDAR 
utilizes a trust management system which assigns trust values to nodes based on 
observed behavior of the nodes, along with recommendation from other nodes. 
SDAR requires each node to construct two symmetric keys, and shares one with 
its neighbors which have high trust values, and the other with its neighbors which 
have medium trust values. When anode S desires to discover a routing path to 
a destination D, S constructs a routing request packet (RREQ), part of which is 
un-encrypted and the other part encrypted. The un-encrypted part of the RREQ 
contains necessary routing information such as the trust level requirement of 
the message and a one-time public key T P K. The encrypted part of the RREQ 
packet contains the destination ID, a symmetric key Ks generated by S and the 
private key TSK for the one-time public key TPK, plus other information. Part 
of the encrypted portion of the message is encrypted with the public key for the 
destination D and the other portion is encrypted with the symmetric key Ks. S 
then encrypts the entire packet with the shared key for the appropriate security 
level of the message and broadcasts it to its neighbors. When an intermediate node 
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ni receives the RREQ packet, it discards the message if it is not able to decrypt 
it. If ni succeeds in decrypting the message, ni adds its ID and a session key Ki 
then signs the portion it added and encrypts it with the one-time public T P K 
embedded in the un-encrypted portion of the RREQ packet; ni then encrypts 
the entire message with the key (of the appropriate security) it shares with it 
neighbors and broadcasts the message. Eventually the message should get to 
D which decrypts the message with the appropriate keys. After verifying the 
signatures, D constructs a route reply (RREP) and encrypts it, first using the 
symmetric key Ks S attached, then encrypts it again using the session keys Ki 's 
in the order that the corresponding intermediate node should receive the RREP 
packet. D then forwards the RREP to its neighbor. The neighbor which is the 
intended next-hop will decrypt its portion of the packet and forwards it to its 
neighbors (one of which will be able to partly decrypt it). The pro cess continues 
until the RREP gets to the source node S which will be able to decrypt the entire 
packet and ascertain the route it seeks. 
Li and Singhal proposed a secure routing scheme [78] which utilizes recom-
mendation and trust evaluation to establish trust relationships between network 
entities. The scheme uses a distributed authentication model which operates as 
follows: each network node maintains a trust table which assigns a quantitative 
trust value to known network entities. If anode S desires to know the trust value 
of a node ni and ni is not in S trust table, S sends out a trust query message-to 
ascertain ni's trust value-to all the trustworthy nodes in S trust table. When 
anode nj receives the trust query message, if ni is in its trust table, it sends 
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the indicated trust value to S; otherwise it sends out a trust query message-
requesting the trust value of ni-to all the trustworthy nodes in its trust table. 
The pro cess continues recursively until eventually anode which has ni in its trust 
table forwards the trust value to the node which requested the info, which will in 
turn forward it to the node which sent it the trust query message; and so on, until 
eventually the response gets to S. S consequently uses the responses to compute a 
trust value for the node in question. This distributed authentication model is used 
to determine the trustworthiness of the network nodes. The end result being that 
nodes which are considered untrustworthy are excluded from routing paths. 
3.2.3 Incentive-base schemes 
In this section we present a brief description of proposed schemes which 
attempt to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes by providing incentives to 
the network nodes. 
Buttyan and Hubaux proposed an incentive-based system for stimulating 
cooperation in MANETs [18]. The scheme requires each network node to have a 
tamper resistant hardware module, called security module. The security module 
maintains a counter, called nuglet counter, which decreases wh en anode sends a 
packet as originator, and increases when anode forwards a packet. The operation 
of the scheme is asfollows: when anode S desires to send a packet to a destina-
tion D, if the number of intermediate nodes on the path from S to D is n, then 
S's nuglet counter must be greater than or equal to n in order for S to send the 
packet. If S has enough nuglets to send the packet, S decreases its nuglet counter 
by n after sending the packet. On the other hand, S increases its nuglet counter 
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by one each time S forwards a packet on behalf of other nodes. The value of a 
nuglet counter must be positive; therefore, it is within a node's interest to forward 
packets on behalf of other nodes, and refrain from sending large number of packets 
to distant destinations. 
Zhong, Chen and Yang presented Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-
Based System for MANETs [130]. Sprite provides incentive for MANET nodes 
to cooperate and report actions honestly. Sprite requires a centralized entity 
called a Credit Clearance Service (CCS) which determines the charge and credit 
involve in sending a message. The basic operation of Sprite is as follows: when 
anode receives a message, the node keeps a receipt of the message. Later when 
the node has a fast connection to a CCS, it reports to the CCS the message it has 
receivedjforwarded by uploading its receipt. The CCS then uses the receipt to 
determine the charge and credit involve in the transmission of the message. 
3.2.4 Schemes which employ detection and isolation me chanis ms 
This section contains a brief description of schemes which utilize detection and 
isolation techniques. We commence the review with an earlier proposaI. 
Marti et al [82] proposed a scheme for mitigating against the presence of 
MANETs nodes that agree to forward packet but fail to do so. The scheme utilizes 
a "watchdog" for identifying misbehaving nodes and a "pathrater" for avoiding 
those nodes. Each node has its own watchdog and pathrater modules. Watchdog 
operation requires the nodes within a MANET to operate in promiscuous mode: 
meaning that a node ni that is within the transmission range of anode nj should 
be able to overhear communications to and from nj even if those communications 
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do not involve ni. Watchdog is based on the assumption that if a packet was 
transmitted to node ni for it to forward the packet to node nj, and a neighboring 
node to ni does not hear the transmission going from ni to nj then it is likely 
that ni is malicious and should therefore be assigned a lower rating. Pathrater is 
responsible of assigning ratings. The rating is assigned as follows: when anode 
ni become known to the pathrater, ni is assigned a "neutral" rating of 0.5. The 
ratings of nodes which are on actively used path are consequently incremented by 
0.01 every 200 ms; whereas, a node's rating is decremented by 0.05 when a link to 
the node is surmised to be nonfunctional. "Neutral" ratings are bounded with an 
upper bound of 0.8 and a lower bound of 0.0; but anode always assign a rating 
of 1.0 to itself. Rather than selecting a path to a given destination based on the 
number of hops in the path, the pathrater selects the path which has the highest 
average rating. 
Buchegger and Le Boudee proposed a proto col called CONFIDANT [104] that 
aims to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes in MANETs. CONFIDANT uses a 
form of reputation systems [99] where the nodes within a MANET rate each other 
based on observed behaviors. Nodes that are deemed to be misbehaving are placed 
on black lists and are consequently isolated. 
Awerbuch et al presented a routing security scheme [6] aimed at providing 
resilience to byzantine failure caused by individual or colluding MANET nodes. 
The scheme utilizes digital signature for authentication at each hop, and it requires 
each no de to maintain a weight list consisting of the reliability metric of the nodes 
within the network. The weight list is used in the route discovery phase to avoid 
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faulty paths. When faults are detected in established paths, an adaptive probing 
technique is launched in an attempt to detect the faulty links. Faulty links are 
given decreased rating and are consequently avoided. 
Just and Kranakis [63] and Kargl et al [65] proposed schemes for detecting 
selfish or malicious nodes in an ad hoc network. The schemes involve probing 
mechanisms which are similar in functionality to that of Awerbuch et al [6] above. 
Patwardhan and Iorga [93] presented a sec ure routing protocol called Se-
cAODV. SecAODV is based on AODV but unlike the latter, it requires each node 
in the MANET to have a static IPv6 address. The scheme allows source and des-
tination nodes to establish sec ure communication channel based on the concept of 
Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) identifiers [83] which 
ensures sec ure binding between an IPv6 address and a key, without requiring 
any trusted certificate authority (CA). SecAODV also provides an IDS (intrusion 
detection system) for monitoring the nodes' activities. 
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CHAPTER4 
Motivation for a decentralized MANET certificate revocation scheme 
The issue of certificate revocation in Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) 
where there are no on-line access to trusted authorities, is a challenging problem. 
In wired network environments, when certificates are to be revoked, certificate 
authorities (CAs) add the information regarding the certificat es in question to 
certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and post the CRLs on accessible repositories 
or distribute them to relevant entities. In purely ad hoc networks, there are 
typically no access to centralized repositories or trusted authorities; therefore the 
conventional method of certificate revocation is not applicable. 
In this thesis, we present a decentralized certificate revocation scheme that 
allows the nodes within a MANET to revoke the certificates of malicious entities. 
The scheme is fully contained and it does not rely on inputs from centralized or 
external entities. Preliminary results of this research project has been published 
in [27, 29] and the final results [4] are accepted for publication in Elsevier Ad Hoc 
Networks Journal. 
4.1 Analysis of existing MANET security schemes 
As MANETs become more ubiquitous, the need for adequate security in these 
networks is more evident. Security schemes for MANETs generally employ one or 
more of the following cryptographie technologies: symmetric-key cryptography, 
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digital certificates or threshold cryptography. Each of these cryptographie tools 
has its particular advantages and drawbacks. We address these issues in the 
respective subsections below. 
4.1.1 Schemes based solely on symmetric-key cryptography 
Security schemes involving symmetric-key cryptography are much less 
computationally exhaustive than those involving digital certificates or threshold 
cryptography. Consequently, the use of symmetric-key cryptography has much 
smaller computational overhead than that associated with digital certificates or 
threshold cryptography. However, security schemes which are based solely on 
symmetric-key cryptography are less robust and offer lower degree of security than 
those involving asymmetric key cryptography, owing to the following: 
• Greater probability of shared key being compromised: If a secret key k is 
shared among a network consisting of n hosts, the probability of the key 
being discovered, increases proportionally with n. Therefore, for optimal 
security, it is necessary for k to be changed at high frequency. 
• If a single host is compromised, the entire network can be compromised: The 
discovery of the secret key k on a single host, means that this key will need 
to be discarded and a new key distributed to aIl the host that shared it. If 
there are no key management mechanisms in place, the keys would need to 
be distributed through secure out-of-band means. This could be rather time 
consuming and problematic for medium or large scale networks. 
• Scalability issues: As outlined above, if a secret key is shared amongst a 
group of hosts, it is necessary that the key be changed periodically; the 
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frequency depends on the level of security desired. For proto col such as 
IEEE 802.11 related standards (WEP, TKIP and CCMP) [54,57], Stajano 
and Anderson [110] and Balfanz et al [7] schemes, the keys need to be 
distributed by sec ure out-of-band means. This might not be an issue for 
small networks; however, this task could be quite tedious and problematic for 
larger networks, and is therefore not a scalable solution. 
As outlined in Section 2.1.1, TKIP and CCMP (IEEE 802.11i security mech-
anisms) have optional key management facilities which use IEEE 802.1X [55] 
authentication proto col. However, the IEEE 802.1X authentication protocol re-
quires access to centralized repositories which may not be available in purely ad 
hoc network environments. Consequently, TKIP and CCMP key management 
framework via IEEE 802.1X authentication proto col is not viable in purely ad hoc 
networks owing to the requirement of on-line access to centralized entities. 
4.1.2 Schemes involving digital certificates 
Digital certificat es are important elements in most commonly used network 
security applications, particularly those providing authentication services. Per-
haps the single feature that accounts for the attractiveness of digital certificate 
technology is the key management issues it favorably addresses, as summarized 
below: 
• Simplify key distribution: Digital certificates do not need to be kept private. 
There are therefore no need for secure channels for distributing certificates. 
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• Reduce effect of compromise: The fact that the certificates are not shared by 
entities, if the private key associated with a given certificate is compromised-
unlike the case of shared secret key technology, which necessitate the 
issuing of a new key to aH the entities sharing the key-in most cases, it 
suffices to replace only the certificate who se associated private key has been 
compromised. The exception is, if it is the CA key that is compromised, 
then it might be necessary to revoked aH the certificat es previously issued by 
that CA. The more stringent security measures applied to CAs private keys, 
should however reduce the likelihood of they being compromised. 
Certificates issued via non-threshold cryptographie schemes require the 
utilization of sorne sort of trust model. The most commonly used trust models 
are (a) hierarchical and (b) web-of-trust models. The hierarchical trust model is 
the more structured approach and the most widely used. In the hierarchical trust 
model, a root certificate authority (CA) issues certificates to delegated CAs or end 
users, the CAs in turn issue certificates to end users or to other CAs. Fig. 4-1 
illustrates the hierarchical trust model. The PKI X.509 (PKIX) framework [24] 
o Represents a CA o Represents an end user 
Figure 4-1: Hierarchical trust model 
exemplifies this trust model. 
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The web-of-trust model [133J is the more distributed approach. In this model, 
there is no distinction between CAs and end users. End users are responsible 
for aIl eertificate management tasks, such as issuing, storage and revocation of 
eertificates. An end user A issues a eertificate to another user B if A trusts B 
or if a user C that A trusts, vouches for B. Fig. 4-2 illustrates the web-of-trust 
mode!. The web-of-trust model appears attractive for utilization in MANETs 
Figure 4-2: Web-of-trust trust model 
security schemes, owing to its distributed nature. However, the web-of-trust model 
is far more susceptible to infiltration of malicious agents than the more structured 
hierarchical model, sinee the latter allows much greater accountability than the 
former. Consider for example a network where a node A trusts another node B; if 
B happens to be a mali cio us agent, B can iSsue valid certificates to sever al other 
malicious agents who would be implicitly trusted by A sinee B-who A trusts-
vouches for these agents. Similarly, if other nodes trust B, these nodes would also 
implicitly trust the malicious agents B vouches for. Consequently, a number of 
malicious agents can gain access to the network if a single untrustworthy node 
happens to convinee another node to issue it a valid certificate. 
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The hierarchical trust model offers greater protection against this eventuality, 
in that the end users are accountable to the CAs that issue the certificat es , and 
the CAs are in turn accountable to other CAs or to the root CA. If a network 
is compromised, this accountability structure allows the elimination of malicious 
agents much more readily. Hierarchical trust model or hybrid models such as that 
utilized in SPKI/SDSI [36, 102] and KeyNote certificat es [10] (see Section 2.2) is 
therefore more preferable, particularly in environments where higher degrees of 
accountability and security are required. Security schemes such as [51, 52, 12, 20] 
are viable solutions for sorne MANET environments; however, owing to the fact 
that they utilize the less stringent web-of-trust model, they may not be suit able 
for MANETs environments where high degrees of accountability and security are 
required. 
There are sorne notable challenges however in utilizing certificat es that are 
based on the more reliable hierarchical trust model in MANETs, owing to the 
decentralized nature of these networks. One particular challenging problem is the 
issue of certificate revocation. For various reasons-such as the compromisation 
of private keys-certificates will need to be revoked periodically, and network 
peers need to be informed about the revoked certificat es in a timely manner. For 
conventional networks, CAs issue certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [45] which 
contain information about revoked certificates, at regular intervals. The CRLs 
are then either broadcast to the relevant nodes, or placed on easily accessible 
centralized repositories. Alternatively, on-line certificate status protocol (OCSP) 
[85] can be used to ascertain information about the status of a certificate. These 
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methodologies are not applicable to MANETs, owing to the fact that MANETs do 
not contain centraHzed entities, and they typically do not provide on-Hne access to 
external entities such as CAs. 
Most of the proposed ad hoc network security schemes which utilized certifi-
cates which do not rely on web-of-trust model, do not explicitly address the issue 
of certificate revocation. Examples of these schemes include [114, 37, 83, 67, 68]. 
Other proposaIs such as Morogan and Muftic [84] and Verma et al [116] schemes 
make the assumption that periodic access to on-Hne CAs is available; therefore 
CRLs can be obtained from the CAs. Then there are proposaIs such as Can-
dolin and Kari [19] which make provision for certificate revocation, and do not 
assume that on-Hne CAs are accessible; but they do not provide protection against 
certificat es being wrongfully revoked through malicious accusations. 
4.1.3 Threshold cryptography schemes 
The utilization of threshold cryptography for the design of MANETs security 
schemes has generated sorne interest. Section 2.3.1 contains a review of MANET 
security schemes which employ threshold cryptography. Zhou and Haas [131] first 
forwarded the idea of utilizing threshold cryptography to distribute trust in ad hoc 
networks. They suggested that the challenges associated with key management 
services in ad hoc networks can be resolved by distributing CA's duties amongst 
the network nodes. For example, a CA signing key can be partitioned into n shares 
and distributed to n nodes. Any k of the n nodes could then collaborate to sign 
and issue valid digital certificates; whereas a coalition of k - 1 or less nodes would 
not be able to do so. This allows certificat es to be issued on the fly in ad hoc 
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network environments, without input from centralized entities. Zhou and Haas 
scheme-as is the case for most existing MANET security schemes which involve 
threshold cryptography (for example [132, 69, 117, 77, 123, 121])-do not address 
the issue of certificate revocation. 
Kong et al [73] presented a threshold cryptography security scheme which 
involves a certificate revocation mechanism. With regard to the certificate revoca-
tion mechanism, the authors suggested that if anode S considers another node ni 
to be compromised, then Scan generate a counter-certificate (which revokes the 
associated certificate), have it signed via threshold cryptography techniques and 
broadcasts it over the network. This certificate revocation mechanism is suscep-
tible to malicious accusation exploits since a single malicious node can cause the 
revocation of another node's certificate. 
Luo et al [80, 72] presented extensions of Kong et al work [73]. These 
proposaIs involve an improved certificate revocation mechanism (see Section 2.3.1) 
which provides some measure of assurance against certificates being wrongfully 
revoked through malicious accusations; however, threshold cryptographie schemes 
have the following noticeable drawbacks: 
• Computationally exhaustive: As indicated in Section 2.3, threshold cryptog-
raphy involves additional computationally intensive modular exponentiations 
compared to the underlined asymmetric-key cryptographie protocols. Most 
low powered wireless nodes do not have the resources to handle such com-
putationally intensive operations. For nodes with less resources constraint, 
the increase in latency due to the extra computational cost, may not be 
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acceptable. For example, the analysis of the implementation in Luo et al 
scheme [80] indicates that generation of a partial RSA signature using one 
of k shares, is approximately 2.5 times slower than standard RSA signing. 
Considering that k partial signatures needs to be generated then combined 
to obtain a valid signature, the increase in latency due to the additional 
computation may not be acceptable. Luo et al [80] states that shares up-
date took approximately 80 seconds to complete on low-end devices they 
employed for testing. It is noteworthy to mention that the update scheme 
they utilized did not entail verifiable secret sharing (VSS); therefore, it only 
provides protection against passive adversaries. For protection against active 
adversaries capable of destroying shares by misbehaving in share update 
schemes, VSS is necessary. Since VSS based share renewal schemes involve 
additional modular exponentiations compared to those schemes based on 
simple Shamir secret sharing, we expect greater computational delays than 
that reported, if the share update scheme utilized in [80], provided protection 
against active adversaries . 
• Require unselfish cooperation: Network security solutions involving threshold 
cryptography require unselfish cooperation of the communicating peers. 
This might not be an issue in certain military applications; however, in most 
commercial network applications, nodes may not behave unselfishly. Wireless 
nodes are often limited in battery power and utilize power conservation 
mechanisms that encourage them to remain dormant unless they are per-
forming necessary services. It might not be realistic therefore to expect nodes 
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in certain environments to behave unselfishly and cooperate, for example to 
service certificate requests. 
In additional to the above, most of the existing MANET security proposaIs 
which involve threshold cryptography-including Luo et al [80] and Kong et al 
[73] schemes-are susceptible to Sybil attack [34], where nodes can spoof their 
identities and acquire multiple certificates. 
The issue of certificate revocation in MANETs is therefore still considered as 
an open problem. 
4.2 Reputation systems 
One of the major contributions of this thesis is a localized certificate revo-
cation scheme we developed. The scheme uses a reputation system which assigns 
quantitative weights to the nodes in a MANET, based on the behavior profiles 
of the nodes. We provide arguments below to support our claim that existing 
reputation systems are not applicable to certificate revocation schemes. 
A number of reputation systems have been published in research literature. 
These systems can be divided into two main types: centralized and distributed 
reputation systems. Centralized reputation systems require central authorities 
for collecting the rating of participants and derive reputation scores. Examples of 
these systems are [99, 106]: the reputation systems on which eBayl forum and 
1 http:j jwww.ebay.com 
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Amazon2 , respectively, are basedj and the page ranking scheme [90] developed 
by the founders of Googlé . Centralized reputation systems are not suitable for 
MANETs since MANETs do not have centralized entities. Decentralized systems 
are more fitting for MANET applications. The majority of proposed decentralized 
reputation systems are transactional basedj that is, they require inputs-such as 
size of upload or down files, quality, price and uploadjdownload experiences-. 
relating to interactions of providers of services and users of the services. Examples 
of transactional based reputation systems are [64, 120, 42, 79, 53]. The non-
transactional based systems previously proposed are not suit able for application 
in certificate revocation schemes because they are either too complex and have 
high associated overhead [125, 2], or they are based on assumptions such as those 
outlined in [3, 129], which are not applicable to certificate revocation schemes. 
2 http:j jwww.amazon.com 
3 http:j jwww.google.com 
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CHAPTER 5 
Motivation for a secure MANET routing proto col for adversarial 
environments 
Secure routing in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) has emerged as a 
important MANET research area. MANETs, by virtue of the fact that they are 
wireless networks, are more vulnerable to intrusion by malicious agents than wired 
networks. In wired networks, appropriate physical security measures, such as 
restriction of physical access to network infrastructures, can be used to attenuate 
the risk of intrusions. Physical security measures are less effective however in 
limiting access to wireless network mediums. Consequently, MANETs are much 
more susceptible to infiltration by malicious agents. Authentication mechanisms 
can help to prevent unauthorized access to MANETs. However, considering the 
high likelihood that nodes with proper authentication credentials can be taken over 
by malicious entities, there are needs for security proto cols which allow MANET 
nodes to operate in potential adversarial environments. 
In this thesis, we present a secure on-demand MANET routing protocol, 
we named Robust Source Routing (RSR). In addition to providing data origin 
authentication services and integrity checks, RSR is able to mitigate against 
intelligent, colluding malicious agents which selectively drop or modify packets 
they agreed to forward. Simulation studies confirm that RSR is capable of 
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maintaining high delivery ratio even when a majority of the MANET nodes are 
malicious. 
5.1 Analysis of existing MANET secure routing schemes 
Research have shown that misbehaving nodes in a MANET can adversely af-
fect the availability of services in the network [82]. Nodes misbehave either because 
they are broken, selfish or malicious. Broken nodes are non-functional. Anode 
can agree to forward traffic on behalf of other nodes but becomes non-functional 
prior to it fulfiIling this agreement. Selfish nodes can agree to forward packets 
but silently drop the packets in attempt to conserve energy and bandwidth. Ma-
licious nodes may seek to disrupt a network and hide their malicious behavior 
by selectively dropping packets they agreed to forward. They may also attempt 
to create denial of service exploits by injecting large number of packets into the 
network. Most of the existing MANET sec ure routing schemes, for example 
[9, 115, 91, 47, 127, 61, 105], do not mitigate against these misbehaviors. 
The existing schemes which attempt to mitigate against these misbehaviors 
use three main approaches: trust-based routing, incentive-based schemes, and 
schemes employing detection and isolation mechanisms. We reviewed the schemes 
which faIl in these categories in Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 respectively. In 
this chapter, we analyze these schemes and highlight the short comings which 
necessitate the needs for a more robust secure routing protocol. 
5.1.1 Trust-based routing 
Yi et al proposed SAR (security-aware ad hoc routing) [124]. SAR classifies 
nodes based on their trust level. Nodes which have the same classification share 
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a secret group key. In a route discovery pro cess , the source node Scan stipulate 
the minimum security requirement a node must have in or der to be an element 
in the routing path from S to a destination D. Scan enforce the stipulation 
by encrypting the route request packet with the shared key associated with the 
specified security level. This approach has its virtues; however, key sharing can be 
problematic: considering the possibility that malicious agents can take over nodes 
with high security classifications and gain access to the secret group keys. 
Yan, Zhang and Virtanen proposed a trust model which assigns quantitative 
trust values to nodes based on observed behavior of the nodes [122]. The applica-
tion of this trust evaluation mechanism in routing schemes is similar in principle 
to SAR [124]. Unlike SAR though, Yan et al proposaI does not suggest a means 
whereby a source node Scan prevent a node-which does not meet the trust level 
requirement-from being on a routing path from S to a given destination. 
Pirzada and McDonald presented a model for trust-based communication 
in ad hoc networks [98]. The trust model depends on features such as passive or 
active acknowledgment of packets, gratuitous route replies (recommendations from 
other nodes regarding possible shorter routes) and routing error information. This 
scheme is susceptible to malicious accusation attacks in that malicious nodes can 
selectively drop packets and wrongfully accuse well-behaving nodes of misbehavior. 
Nekkanti and Lee proposed a trust based adaptive on-demand routing 
proto col [88]. The proto col uses encryption mechanisms to mask the routing 
path between the source and destination from aIl the other nodes. This scheme 
provides a degree of anonymity for nodes in routing paths; but it does not provide 
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protection against misbehaving nodes which selectively drop packets they agreed to 
forward. 
Boukerche et al proposed SDAR (secure distributed anonymous routing 
protocol) [16]. The main objective of SDAR is to allow nodes to participate in 
routing without compromising their anonymity. The authors suggested that 
as a means of countering malicious dropping behavior, nodes can operate their 
network interfaces in promiscuous mode l and report observed discrepancies 
regarding unconfirmed packet transmission. This operation is similar to that of 
Marti et al [82] "Watchdog" operation and is therefore susceptible to the short 
comings-outline in Section 5.1.3 below-associated with Marti et al scheme. 
Li and Singhal proposed a secure routing scheme [78] which utilizes observed 
behavior patterns and recommendations from other nodes to assign quantitative 
trust values to the nodes in a MANET. The scheme has its merits but malicious 
agents can thwart the scheme by dropping the trust query messages, and in so 
doing, renders the scheme ineffective. 
5.1.2 Incentive-based schemes 
Buttyan and Hubaux proposed an incentive-based system for stimulating 
cooperation in MANETs [18]. The scheme requires each network node to have a 
tamper resistant hardware module, called security module. The security module 
1 meaning that a node ni which is within the transmission range of anode nj 
should be able to overhear communications to and from nj even if those communi-
cations do not involve ni 
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maintains a counter, referred to as nuglet counter, which decreases when anode 
sends a packet as originator, and increases when anode forwards a packet. 
The scheme stipulates that each node's nuglet counter must remain positive; 
consequently, nodes are encouraged to forward packets for other nodes and refrain 
from sen ding large number of packets to distant destinations. The scheme offers 
an effective mechanism for discouraging selfishness; however it may not experience 
widespread use because of the requirement for a tamper resistant hard module. 
Zhong, Chen and Yang presented Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-
Based System for MANETs [130]. Sprite provides incentive for MANET nodes 
to cooperate and report actions honestly. It avoids the requirement of tamper 
resistant hardware module; instead, it requires on-line access to a centralized entity 
called a Credit Clearance Service (CCS), which determines the charge and credit 
involved in transmitting a message. This scheme is based on the assumption that 
on-line access to a CCS is available. This assumption may not hold for purely ad 
hoc networks, which do not guarantee access to on-line entities. 
5.1.3 Schemes employing detection and isolation me chanis ms 
Marti et al [82] proposed a scheme for mitigating against the presence of 
MANET nodes that agree to forward packet but fail to do so. The scheme utilizes 
a "watchdog" for identifying misbehaving nodes and a "pathrater" for avoiding 
those nodes. Watchdog operation requires the nodes within a MANET to operate 
in promiscuous mode. Watchdog is based on the assumption that if a packet was 
transmitted to node ni for it to forward the packet to no de nj, and a neighboring 
node to ni do es not hear the transmission going from ni to nj then it is likely 
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that ni is malicious and should therefore be assigned a lower rating. This scheme 
has several weaknesses. As described in the authors' own words: "Watchdog's 
weakness are that it might not detect a misbehaving node in the presence of 1) 
ambiguous collisions, 2) receiver collisions, 3) limited transmission power, 4) false 
misbehavior, 5) collusion, and 6) partial dropping." 
Buchegger and Le Boudec proposed a proto col called CONFIDANT [104] that 
aims to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes in MANETs. CONFIDANT uses a 
form of reputation systems [99] where the nodes within a MANET rate each other 
based on observed behaviors. Nodes that are deemed to be misbehaving are placed 
on black lists and are consequently isolated. The reputation systems, however, do 
not provide any protection against false accusations. Consequently, the scheme is 
susceptible to blackmailing. 
Awerbuch et al presented a routing security scheme [6] aimed at providing 
resilience to byzantine failure caused by individu al or colluding MANET nodes. 
The scheme utilizes digital signature for authentication at each hop, and it requires 
each node to maintain a weight list consisting of reliability metrics of the nodes 
within the network. The weight list is used in the route discovery phase to avoid 
faulty paths. When faults are detected in established paths, an adaptive probing 
technique is launched in an attempt to detect the faulty links. Faulty links are 
given decreased rating and are consequently avoided. Probing techniques are useful 
in identifying faults caused by non-malicious acts. However, they are ineffective 
against malicious agents, sim ply because the probing packets are distinguishable 
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from other packetsj therefore, an adversary can choose to behave well when it is 
being probed, but behave maliciously during intervals when it is not being probed. 
Just and Kranakis [63] and Kargl et al [65] proposed schemes for detecting 
selfish or malicious nodes in an ad hoc networks. The schemes involve probing 
mechanisms which as is the case with [6], the probing packets are distinguishable 
from other packets. 
Patwardhan and Iorga [93] presented a secure routing protocol called 
SecAODV. SecAODV is based on AODV but unlike the latter, it requires each 
node in the MANET to have a static IPv6 address. The scheme allows source 
and destination nodes to establish secure communication channels based on the 
concept of Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) identifiers 
[83] which ensures sec ure binding between an IPv6 address and a key, without 
requiring any trusted certificate authority (CA). The application of this protocol 
is currently very restrictive because of the requirement that each of the MANET 
nodes must have a static IPv6 address. 
Summary 
Table 5-1 summaries the analysis we presented in this chapter. The analysis 
shows that the existing sec ure MANET routing schemes do not adequately 
mitigate against misbehaving nodes which selectively drop packets they agreed 
to forward, and in so doing, these misbehaving nodes can cause various network 
communication problems. The secure routing protocol we developed is aimed at 
addressing this security need. 
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Table 5-1: Summary of routing security analysis 
Schemes Comments 
Schemes which SRP [91], SEAD [47], SAODV [127], Ariadne [46], ARAN [105], 
do not address Binkley et al [9] and Venkatraman et al [115] schemes do not 
packet dropping address packet dropping. 
Trust-based SAR [124] requires shared group keys; therefore it is subjected to 
schemes the key management issues outlined in Section 4.1.1. Pirzada et 
al and Nekkanti et al [98, 88] do not provide protection against 
packet dropping; SDAR [16] is subjected to the short comings 
indicated below for Marti et al scheme; Li et al [78] scheme can 
be thwarted by dropping the trust query messages. 
Incentive-based Buttyan et al [18] requires tamper resistant hardware and Zhong 
schemes et al [130] requires on-line access to a centralized entity; there-
fore, these schemes are limited in their applications. 
Schemes which Marti et al [82], in the author's own words, has the following 
employ detection weaknesses: "it might not detect a misbehaving node in the 
and isolation presence of 1) ambiguous collisions, 2) receiver collisions, 3) lim-
mechanisms ited transmission power, 4) false misbehavior, 5) collusion, and 
6) partial dropping." Buchegger et al [104] scheme does not 
provide protection against false accusations. The probing tech-
nique Awerbuch et al, Just et al and Patwardhan et al schemes 
[6, 63, 93] utilize, is ineffective against intelligent adversaries 
which selectively drop packets, since the probing packets are not 
completely indistinguishable from other data packets. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A localized certificate revocation scheme for MANETs 
In this chapter, we present the MANET certificate revocation scheme we 
developed. 
6.1 Overview of the certificate revocation scheme 
Our scheme stipulates that before entering a network, the MANET nodes 
must have a valid certificate from a recognized CA, as weU as the public keys of 
the CAs which issued certificates for potential network peers. The certificates can 
be used for network authentication. The nodes will be able to verify the validity of 
the certificates, since they have the public keys of the CAs which issued them. The 
MANET nodes are therefore responsible for aU key management tasks except the 
issuing of certificates. For optimum security, a CA should verify the identity of a 
node before issuing it a certificate. 
Our certificate revocation scheme requires the nodes in a MANET to monitor 
the behavior of the other nodes. If anode sur mises that a given node is behaving 
suspiciously, it is required to broadcast an accusation against the node in question. 
Our scheme utilizes the self-healing community approach presented in [71] for 
disseminating the accusation information via broadcast. Self-healing community 
approach is based on the observation that in a MANET, any node that is within 
both node A and node C transmission range can in principle forward packets from 
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node A to C. For example, in Fig. 6-1, node A and C are outside the transmission 
self-healing community 
0 0 0 0 
0 
• 
• C A 0 
0 
0 0 
Figure 6-1: Self-healing communi ty forwarding 
range of each other. In principle, any of the nodes (nI, n2, n3, n4) within the self-
healing community can forward packet from A to C. So, if a malicious or selfish 
node within a self-healing community chooses not to forward a packet it is asked to 
forward, any other node within the community can provide the service instead. A 
self-healing community is functional as long as there is at least one weU-behaving 
node in the community. This approach requires the network interfaces of the 
MANET nodes to stay in promiscuous reception mode. For further detail and 
analysis of the self-healing community concept, see [71]. 
Our certificate revocation scheme requires each participating node to compile 
and maintain data-based on broadcast accusation information-about aU the 
nodes in the network. The coUected data is used to assign a quantitative value 
for the trustworthiness of a node. Accusations from any given node are weighted 
based on the trustworthiness of the accuser: the higher the trustworthiness of a 
node, the greater the weight of its accusations, and vice versa. A node's certificate 
is revoked if the value of the sum of accusation weights against the given node 
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is greater than a configurable threshold. The proto col aims at providing similar 
data to each node for computing the trust ratings of the network peers; the end 
goal being that the nodes have consistent information regarding the status of the 
certificates of their network peers. 
6.1.1 Cryptographie primitives 
For efficiency considerations, rather than relying on digital signatures for 
message origin authentication and content integrity checks, we mainly use one-
way hash chains [76J. One-way hash chains are based on one-way hash functions. 
A one-way hash function H, maps an input x of any length to an output y of 
fixed length, such that, given y, it is computationally infeasible to find x, where 
H(x) = y. Two commonly used one-way hash functions are SHA-1 [89J-which 
pro duces 160-bit outputs-and MD5 [101], which gives 128-bit outputs. 
A one-way hash chain can be created by choosing a random value x of arbi-
trary length and compute the hash chain values Yo, YI, Y2, ... , Yn-l, Yn, where Yo = x 
and Yi = H(Yi-I), such that 0 < i ::::; n, for a given n. The hash chain values-in 
order of decreasing subscript i (that is, from right to left in the list above)-at 
varying point in time can then be used for authentication or as symmetric keys 
for keyed hashing functions such as HMAC [75J. When the hash chain values are 
used as keys for keyed hashing functions, for example, Yn can be signed and be dis-
tributed to network peers who will use it to authenticate the other Yi values. Yn-l 
can then be utilized with HMAC to generate a message integrity code (MIC) for a 
message ml, and appended to ml before it is transmitted. After a designated time 
period, Yn-l is released and utilized by the recipient of ml to verify the message 
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integrity. Similarly, at a later point in time, Yn-2 can be used to generate a MIe 
for another message m2. The network peers are able to authenticate the Yi values 
since Yn is signed and they can verify whether Yi+l = H(Yi), for all previously seen 
i ~ n. Unlike TESLA [97], our proto col does not require time synchronization, 
owing to the unique way we utilize the hash chains. 
6.2 Detail of scheme 
The following assumptions are made regarding to the MANETs and the nodes 
that constitute the networks: 
• The number of malicious or selfish nodes is less than the number of well-
behaving nodes. 
• The network interfaces of the nodes are capable of operating in promiscuous 
reception mode. 
• Each node has only one valid certificate. 
The first dut y of anode when it enters a MANET is to compute a series of 
hash chain values Yo, YI, Y2, ... , Yn-l, Yn, using an agreed upon hash function H, 
as outlined in Section 6.1.1, if they have not been computed a priori; sign Yn and 
broadcast it along with its certificate to the nodes in the network. Upon receiving 
a signed Yn and the corresponding certificate, the nodes verify that the certificate 
is valid. If it is valid and it is not revoked, and the signature on the Yn value is 
valid, the nodes store both the certificate and Yn; sign their profile tables and their 
Yn values, and unicast them to the sender of the certificate. Note that if anode 
has already used any of its Yi values to secure messages, it will sign and send the 
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last Yi it utilized-as its Yn value-to new entrants to the network. A profile table 
contains information about the behavior profile of the nodes in the MANET. 
Upon receiving the profile tables with valid signatures from its network 
peers, anode is required to compile its own profile table which is initially based 
on the information contained in the profile tables it received. Transmission of 
profile tables to new entrants to the network is necessary in order to ensure that 
the newcomers have up-to-date information regarding the behavior profile of its 
network peers. 
A profile table can be represented as a packet of varied length depending 
on the number of accusations launched against the nodes. The length ranges 
from a minimum of 80 bits-when there are no accusations-to a maximum of 
97(N - 2) + 145, where N is the number of nodes in the network. A profile table 
contains the following fields: 
1. Owner's ID: This field is the first 32 bits of the profile table. It contains the 
certificate seriaI number of the node that compiled the profile table. 
2. Node count: This 16-bit field contains a short integer indicating the node 
perspective regarding the number of nodes in the network. 
3. Peer i ID: This is a 32-bit field containing the certificate seriaI number of a 
node that is accused of misbehavior. This field also serves the purpose of a 
marker: if it contains zero, it indicates the end of the profile table. 
4. Certificate status: This field contains 1-bit flag. The bit is set if the certifi-
cate is revoked, and unset otherwise. 
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5. Accusation info: The first 32 bits of this 64-bit field contains the certificate 
seriaI number of anode that accused peer i of misbehavior. The remaining 
32 bits contain the date that the accusation was made. 
If field 3 does not contain zero, the profile table continues with the certificate 
status and accusation information fields; and if there are more than one accusers, 
it continues with 97-bit blocks containing information about the other accusers. 
Figure 6-2 illustrates the fields of a profile table. 
Ce;tificate status 
" .... 
Figure 6-2: Fields of a profile table 
The proto col requires each node to keep track of the following variables, the 
values of which are obtained from its profile table . 
• Number of accusations against node (i) (Ai): This is the total number 
of accusations made against a given node i. When anode receives an 
authenticated accusation against node i, it updates its profile table, and 
consequently this variable, if and only if both node i and the accuser 
certificat es are not revoked and no previous accusation by the accuser against 
node i is recorded . 
• Number of additional accusations made by node i (ai): When anode receives 
authenticated accusation information from node i, it updates its profile table 
and consequently this variable, if and only if the certificat es of both no de i 
and the node that is being accused of misbehavior (node j) are not revoked 
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and no previous accusation by node i against node j is recorded. Anode is 
not charged for the first accusation it makes; hence, ai is actually the total 
number of accusations node i made minus one. 
• Behavior index of node i ({3i): The behavior index ({3i) of anode i is a 
measure of the trustworthiness of the node i. {3i is a fioating point number 
such that 0 ::; {3i ::; 1. The greater the value of {3i, the more trustworthy node 
i is perceived to be. {3i is computed as follows: 
(6.1) 
where À = UL3 and N is the number of nodes in the network. 
• Weight of node i accusation (Wi): This is a quantitative value that is assigned 
to the weight of a node's accusation. It depends on the behavior index of the 
node and on the number of accusations the node made. Wi is a fioating point 
number such that 0 ::; Wi ::; 1. It is calculated as follows: 
(6.2) 
where À is as indicated above. 
• Revocation quotient (Rj): This fioating point number determines whether 
the certificate for node j should be revoked. A certificate is revoked if Rj 
is greater than or equal to the revocation quotient threshold RT. RT is a 
configurable parameter whose value depends on the sensitivity of the security 
requirement. Typical values of RT are ~, k or ~. Rj can be computed as 
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follows: 
N 
Rj = L(JijWi 
i=l 
(6.3) 
where (Jij = 1 if node i launched a complain against node j, and 0 otherwise. 
• Cerlificate status (Cj ): Indicates whether or not the certificate of node j is 
revoked. As indicated above, a certificate is revoked if Rj 2: R T . 
6.2.1 Determining the number of nodes in the network 
MANETs are dynamic in nature: nodes may join and leave the networks on 
frequent basis. Consequently, the number of nodes N in any given MANET will 
likely not be constant. Our revocation scheme uses the mechanism outlined below 
for determining the number of nodes in the network at any given time. As outlined 
earlier, when anode enters a MANET, it is required to broadcast its certificate 
and the Yn value of its hash chain to aIl the network nodes. Upon receiving the 
broadcast, the peers are expected to uni cast their certificat es along with their hash 
chains Yn values to the new node. The certificates and the Yn values can be stored 
using any appropriate data structure. However, our proto col stipulates that each 
certificate entry should contain a field for storing an associated date. The date, 
including the time, that the certificate was received should initially be stored in 
this field. 
After broadcasting its certificate, each node is required to broadcast short 
messages containing its certificate seriaI number and the date and time that the 
message was sent, at a configurable time interval of T minutes. The value of T 
depends on the frequency of the change in the network membership. We caU these 
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messages, membership confirmation messages. For message origin authentication 
and content integrity checks, a MIe of the message should be generated-using 
an agreed upon secure keyed hashing function and the hash chain value (with the 
highest subscript) that has not been previously used, as the key-and appended 
to the message. When anode receives a membership confirmation message mi, 
from anode j, it stores it in memory or in a temporary file. The next membership 
confirmation message or accusation information message from node j, should 
contains the Yi value that was used to compute the MIe for the previous message 
(mi) from the source. The node should first verify that the Yi value is authentic 
by ascertaining whether the hash of Yi equals the last previously revealed hash 
chain value of the source; that is, whether Yi+l = H(Yi)' If it is authentic, it 
computes the MIe of the message mi using Yi as the key; if the MIe is identical 
to that which was appended to mi, the node updates the date field associated 
with the certificate entry for node j, with the date indicated in mi. It should be 
noted that, as explained in Section 6.2.2 below, the proto col does not require time 
synchronization. 
If anode do es not receive a verified authenticated membership confirmation 
message from any given node within 1.5T minutes, the certificate entry for the 
node in question, should be deleted from the node's certificate repository. The 
number of entries in the certificate repository for any given node, should therefore 
closely reflect the actual number of nodes in the network. 
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6.2.2 Security mechanism 
The messages our certificate revocation protocol exchange can be categorized 
as follows: 
1. Initialization messages: These messages are sent wh en there is a new entrant 
to the MANET. A new entrant broadcasts its digital certificate and its Yn 
value to the nodes in the network; the MANET nodes in return uni cast 
their Yn values and profile tables to the new entrant. The protocol requires 
a digital signature scheme for authenticating the Yn values and the profile 
tables. 
2. Membership confirmation and accusation info messages: The majority of 
the messages the proto col exchanges fall in this category. For efficiency 
considerations, we utilized hash chains for verifying the integrity and 
authenticity of these messages. 
After anode j broadcast its certificate and its hash chain Yn value to its 
network peers, the next membership confirmation or accusation info message mi 
it sends, it uses its hash chain Yn-l value to compute a MIC for mi and appends 
it to mi before sending the message. Node j then appends its Yn-l value to the 
next membership confirmation or accusation info message mi+! it sends and in 
turn uses Yn-2 to generate a MIC for mi+l. On receiving mi from node j, the 
recipients need to wait until they receive mi+l from node j before they can verify 
the authenticity and integrity of mi. Membership confirmation messages are sent 
every T minutes; T is a configurable parameter. As outlined in Section 6.2.1, an 
accusation messages can be sent at anytime. Therefore anode should not have to 
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wait for more than T minutes to authenticate any given message. If anode do es 
not receive the hash chain value required to verify the authenticity and integrity 
of a message mi within 1.5T minutes, the node is required to discard mi. Time 
synchronization is not required because the time interval T is a local parameter 
and as shown below in Section 6.3.1, it is not necessary to have global consensus 
on precisely when this interval st arts or ends. 
6.3 Discussion 
Our certificate revocation scheme allows MANETs' nodes to revoke the 
certificates of mali cio us or misbehaving nodes; in so doing the malicious or 
misbehaving nodes are effectively isolated from a given MANET. The scheme 
is designed so as to prevent malicious nodes from being able to use wrongful 
accusations to cause the revocation of the certificates of well-behaving nodes. We 
elaborate on this issue further in Section 6.3.1. 
The certificate revocation scheme provides a methodology of quantifying the 
trustworthiness of MANETs' nodes based on the behavior profiles of the nodes. 
The value of a node's trustworthiness determines the weight of its accusation. 
The weight of node ni accusations, depends on the number of accusations made 
against node ni, as weIl as the number of accusations node ni made. If a number 
of accusations is made against anode, it is likely that this node in question is 
malicious or misbehaving. Similarly, if a node made a large number of accusations, 
particularly if the accusations are not supported by other nodes, it is also likely 
that this node is malicious. Anode is not charged for the first accusation it 
made. Additionally, when the certificate of anode nj is revoked, aIl the nodes 
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that accused no de ni of misbehavior will have one subtracted from the individu al 
total of the number of accusations they made. Similarly, when the certificate of 
a node ni is revoked, one is subtracted from the individu al total of the number 
of accusations against aIl the nodes that node ni accused of misbehavior. In so 
doing, the nodes are not permanently charged for legitimate accusations they 
made; likewise, they are not permanently charged for accusations malicious nodes 
made against them. It should be noted however that when a certificate if revoked, 
it cannot be un-revoked. This is necessary to prevent the formation of loops in the 
pro cess of deducting accusations originated from suspected malicious nodes. 
The underline principle of the scheme is that the weight of a node's accusation 
should be exactly zero if the behavior index (trustworthiness) of the node is the 
minimum possible value and the node made the maximum number of accusations 
that is aIlowed. The maximum number of accusations which can be made against 
any given no de is N - 1 where N is the number of nodes in the network. Therefore 
the minimum value for f3i is 1 - À(N - 1). As indicated ab ove , for fairness 
considerations, anode is not charged for the first accusation it made; hence 
the maximum number of accusations that any given node can be charged for 
is N - 2. Consequently, Wi = 0 when Ai = N - 1 and Qi = N - 2, that is, 
Wi = 1 - À(N - 1) - À(N - 2) = O. So the normalization variable À, which ensures 
that the behavior index (f3d is always within the range of zero and one inclusively, 
irrespect ive of the value of N, is equal to 2!J -3. 
Our revocation scheme requires that new entrants to a MANET be sent the 
profile tables of the existing members of the MANET. This is necessary to ensure 
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that the newcomers have up-to-date information about the behavior profile of 
the current members of the MANET. Unlike accusation info and membership 
confirmation messages, which use message integrity code (MIC) for message origin 
and integrity checks, profile table messages are authenticated with signatures. 
The use of signatures eliminate the delay in authenticating the message, in that 
the recipient of the profile tables do not have to wait for the release of hash chain 
values to authenticate the message. Profile tables are unicast only when new 
entrants enter a network; therefore the generation and verification of signatures for 
profile table messages should have minimal effect on the overall performance of the 
proto col. 
As outlined in Section 6.1, our certificate revocation scheme utilizes the 
self-healing community approach presented in [71] for forwarding packets. This 
approach provides redundancy, in that if a malicious node drops a packet it is 
expected to forward, a well-behaving node in the community can detect the 
malicious activity and provide the service of forwarding the packet. If there is no 
well-behaving node in a self-healing community, adversarial agents may succeed in 
preventing accusation information from reaching certain nodes. Consequently there 
may be variations in the profile tables. In cases where there are variations, the 
new entrant is expected to fill the fields of its profile table with the values in the 
respective fields of the majority of the profile tables. This may result in differences 
in the computed f3i, Wi and ~ values. Hence a certificate may not be revoked on 
all nodes instantaneously; however within negligible time interval, the certificate 
of a malicious node should be revoked on enough nodes which participate in the 
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protocol, such that the malicious nodes will be rendered ineffective in perpetuating 
their adversarial behaviors. 
The proto col do es not require the cooperation of aIl nodes in a MANET. 
Malicious or misbehaving nodes may not adhere to the protocol; furthermore they 
may attempt to thwart the protocol by not forwarding accusation and membership 
confirmation messages. There are strong motivations though for well-behaving 
nodes to participate, since it is within their interest to help eliminate malicious or 
misbehaving nodes from the network. 
6.3.1 Security analysis 
In this section, we analyze the security of our certificate revocation proto col 
using a game-theoric approach. In the game, the goals of the adversaries are: i) 
to disrupt the proto col by preventing accusation information and membership 
confirmation messages from non-adversarial nodes from reaching their destinations; 
ii) prevent the revocation of their certificates; and iii) cause the revocation of 
certificates of well-behaving nodes. Whereas the goal of the well-behaving nodes is 
to revoke the certificates of malicious entities and consequently isolate them from 
the network. We show below that the probability of adversarial nodes achieving 
their goals is very low. 
Security properties 
If the number of well-behaving nodes (k) is sufficiently large, that is, 
k > 2+y'4+8RT(2N-3) h R· h . . h h Id d N . _ 4 ' W ere T IS t e revocatlOn quotient t res 0 an IS 
the number of nodes in the network, then the proto col is: 
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1) resistant to adversarial attacks; 
II) effective in revoking the certificates of adversarial nodes. 
Proof sketch of Property 1): The proof utilizes the attack scenarios 
outlined below to show the following: 
l) the effectiveness of the hash chain security mechanism; 
2) at least RT malicious entities are required to cause the revocation of 
the certificate of a well-behaving node; 
3) The probability of malicious nodes succeeding in filtering messages from 
well-behaving nodes is very small. 
la) As outlined in Section 6.2.2 above, there is a delay in verifying the au-
thenticity and integrity of accusation info and membership confirmation messages 
because the recipients of the messages need to wait until they receive the hash 
chain values for computing the MIe for the given messages. One possible attack 
malicious nodes can mount as a result of the delay in verifying the authenticity of 
a message, is to delay forwarding a message mi until it receives the message mi+l 
which contains the key for computing the MIe for mi; then modifies mi and uses 
the key revealed in mi+l to generate a new MIe for the modified mi (mi), appends 
it to mi, then forwards the modified message. 
If there are functional self-healing communities1 , the message mi should get 
to its destinations before the modified message mi. The protocol necessitates that 
a given Yi hash chain value cannot be used more than once. Therefore on seeing mi 
1 We outline the consequences of non-functional self-healing communities below. 
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been authenticated with the same hash chain value as that utilized to ascertain the 
authenticity of the previously received mi, the recipient will discard the modified 
message mi; consequently the attack will not succeed. 
1 b) M alicious nodes impersonate other nodes and use the spoofed identities to 
launch accusations against well-behaving nodes. 
If a malicious entity M spoofed the identity of node j, then prior to sending 
any accusation message using node j identity, M must prevent membership 
conformation and accusation messages from j from reaching well-behaving nodes. 
This is necessary since, as explained in item la) ab ove , a hash chain value can 
only be used once for authenticating a message. If there are functional self-healing 
communities, this attack will not succeed. 
2) Adversarial entities act in collusion, target one well-behaving node at a time 
and launch accusations against the targeted node in efforts to cause the revocation 
of its certificate. 
As outlined in the heuristic argument below, this attack is only possible if 
the number of malicious nodes is greater than or equal to the revocation quotient 
threshold RT . If we assume the worst case scenario where no accusation is made 
against any of the malicious nodes and the weight of the accusations (Wi) of each 
of the malicious nodes is at the maximum value possible; if no accusation is made 
against any of the malicious nodes, then based on Equation (6.1) in Section 6.2, 
{Ji = 1 for each of the malicious nodes; and since Wi = 1 (maximum value), 
then each of the malicious nodes made only one accusation, which is directed 
at the victim they targeted (node j). If there are m malicious nodes, based on 
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Equation (6.3) in Section 6.2, Rj = mWi, that is, Rj = m. A certificate is 
revoked if Rj ;::: RT . Therefore if the malicious nodes are to succeed in causing 
the revocation of a certificate, the minimum requirement is that m must be 
equal to RT . If anything other than the worst case scenario is assumed, that 
is, accusation(s) is/are made against any of the malicious nodes, or any of the 
malicious nodes made more than one accusations, then m must be greater than 
RT for the malicious nodes to succeed in revoking the certificate of a well-bèhaving 
node. 
3) Adversarial entities act in collusion and create non-functional self-healing 
communities; consequently isolate targeted nodes fram the rest of the network. 
If colluding adversarial entities form self-healing communities which contain 
no well-behaving node, they can essentially partition the network and isolate tar-
geted nodes. If this occurs, the adversarial entities can reduce the effectiveness of 
the protocol; for example, if one or more well-behaving node(s) is/are isolated from 
the rest of the network, it is possible that the number of un-isolated well-behaving 
nodes may be less than the number of mali cio us nodes. If this were to occur, a 
key assumption on which the proto col is based would not be satisfied. It should 
be noted however that non-transient non-functional self-healing communities are 
unlikely considering that malicious nodes typically cannot restrict the movement of 
non-compromised nodes. Additionally, Kong et al [71] shows that the probability 
that an expected area of a self-healing community, E(Aheal ), contains k honest 
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nodes is given by: 
where y is a random variable for the number of honest nodes, L is the number of 
nodes, () is the proportion of malicious nodes, and PL is the node density function, 
which is dependent on the location in space. This probability function arises from 
a series of computations based on the spatial analytical model Kong et al [71] used 
for verifying the effectiveness of self-healing community forwarding. If k = 0, that 
is, if there are no well-behaving nodes in a self-healing community, this probability 
becomes 
Pr[y = k] = J r e-(l-O) PLdA 
} E(Aheatl 
which is small since the value of the function e-(l-O) PL is small. 
Hence, non-transient, non-functional self-healing communities are unlikely. 
Consequently, the probability of adversarial entities succeeding in filtering mes-
sages from well-behaving nodes is low; therefore, by la), lb) and 2) above the 
proto col is resistant to adversarial attacks. 
Proof of Property II): Next, we show that the protocol is effective in 
revoking the certificat es of malicious nodes. Recall that from 3) above, non-
functional self-healing communities are unlikely. 
If there are no non-functional self-healing communities, the following show 
o 
that malicious entities in a MANET are incapable of preventing the revocation of 
their certificates provided that the number of well-behaving nodes (k) is greater 
h 1 2+y4+8RT(2N-3) h R· h . . h h Id t an or equa to 4 ' W ere T lS t e revocatlOn quotIent t res 0 
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and N is the number of nodes in the network. Assume the worst case scenario 
where each of the N - k malicious nodes made an accusation against each of the 
k well-behaving nodes. Based on Equation (6.1) in Section 6.2, the behavior index 
((Ji) for each of the well-behaving nodes would be (Ji = 1 - >'(N - k) = i - ~--=-k3 = 
~t'"--~/. AIso, assume that each of the well-behaving nodes made an accusation 
against each of the N - k malicious nodes; then based on Equation (6.2) in Section 
6.2, Wi = ~t'"-33 - (~-;t31) = ;~-=-~. 
By Equation (6.3), the certificate of any misbehaving node j, is revoked if 
Rj = k~ 2 Rr. Which implies that 2k2 - 2k - Rr(2N - 3) 2 0; that is, 
D 
Example : Consider a MANET with 100 nodes, if Rr = l~O then k 2 70.68; 
if Rr = 19O, k 2 57.80 or if Rr = l~O, k 2 50.13. These values of k are for 
the worst case scenario where the malicious nodes choose to accuse aIl the well-
behaving nodes of misbehavior and in so doing, increase the probability of they 
been more speedily identified as being malicious. If anything other than the worst 
case is assumed, the values for k would be smaller, that is, a smaller number of 
well-behaving nodes would be necessary to guarantee that identified malicious 
nodes are incapable of preventing the revocation of their certificates. 
6.3.2 Computation and communication overhead 
Every network security scheme has sorne associated computation and commu-
nication overhead. Our certificate revocation scheme mainly uses message integrity 
code (MIC)-which can be computed very efficiently-for message origin and 
integrity checks. Digital signatures are utilized only for authenticating profile table 
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messages and hash chain Yn values when new hash chains are computed. Profile ta-
ble messages are sent very infrequently: only when a new no de enters the MANET; 
and if the hash chains are made long enough, one or two hash chains per node, 
that is, one or two Yn value(s) per network session should suffice. Therefore the 
signing and verification of signatures for profile table messages and Yn hash chain 
values should have limited effect on the performance of the certificate revocation 
scheme owing to the infrequency with which these operations occur. 
The communication overhead depends on the total number of nodes N in 
the MANET, the number of misbehaving or malicious nodes, and the value of the 
configurable time interval T mentioned in Section 6.2.1. The data the protocol 
transmit are the profile table and the certificate of each node whenever a new 
node enters the network. Additionally, each node sends a 64-bit membership 
confirmation message, plus the 128 or 160-bit MIe every T minutes, which 
accounts for bandwidth utilization of approximately 3.4 * N * T bits/second. The 
bandwidth utilizes for the broadcast of accusation information depends on the 
number of malicious or misbehaving nodes in the network. 
6.3.3 Communication complexity 
In this section we derive the communication complexity of our certificate re-
vocation protocol. We are interested in knowing how many accusation information 
messages are required to revoke a certificate. The computation is simple in the 
case where there is only one adversarial node, say node j. If a well-behaving node i 
is accused by the adversary, then Ai = 1, ai = 0, f3i = 1 - >. and Wi = 1 - >. (recall 
from Section 6.2 that Ai is the total number of accusations made against node 
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i, ai is the number of accusations (minus 1) made by node i, (Ji is the behavior 
index and Wi is the weight of node i accusation). Similarly, based on Equation 
(6.3) in Section 6.2, Rj = ~ih Wi, since aij = 1. If a malicious node j makes n 
accusations against the nodes in the set N, then we need N' nodes to accuse node 
j of misbehavior. Therefore 
Rj = LWi + LWi = a(1- À) + (N' - 1- a) = N' - 1- Àa 2:: RT 
iEN if/.N 
Hence, node j certificate is revoked if N' 2:: 1+Àa+RT . In the general case, there is 
a set A of K :S N /2 adversarial nodes. Let aij denotes the number of accusations 
(minus one) made by well-behaving node i after accusing an adversarial node j. As 
is the case for the single adversarial node (outlined ab ove ), to revoke the certificate 
of one adversarial node, we need N' such that: 
if/.A,i$N' i$N' if/.A,i$N' 
a-- > RT tJ -
The above is obtained by combining Equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) in Section 6.2. 
The minimum N' required is: 
N' = K + À L Ai + L aij + RT (6.4) 
i$N' if/.A,i$N' 
Since the well-behaving nodes make accusations in random order, we compute 
the expected value of N'. There are K adversarial nodes such that K < N /2, 
therefore: 
N 
< (N - K)K :S 2(N - 1) (6.5) 
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Since we do not know the total number of accusations that a well-behaving node i 
will make, we approximate the expected value of aij to be ~, which is half of the 
maximum number of accusations it can make, that is: 
E [ L aij] 
i~A,i'5.N' 
~ E[N']. K 
2 
Solving for expected value of N' by substituting Equations (6.5) and (6.6) into 
(6.4), we obtain: 
E[N'J < 1-~K/2 [K+À~(N-l)+RTl 
< 1-4(~-1/N) [~ (1+~=!;~)+RTl 
~ linear in N 
where À = 1/(2N - 3). 
(6.6) 
This implies that a linear number of accusation information broadcasts (which 
cost order N 2 messages) are sufficient to revoke the certificate of an adversarial 
node. 
6.4 Simulation setup and results 
We simulated the protocol using NS2 network simulator. The aim of the 
simulation is to determine average case performances of the scheme with regards 
to its effectiveness in revoking the certificat es of identified malicious nodes; 
and in particular to ascertain the average number of accusations necessary to 
cause the revocation of certificates for various combinations of number of well-
behaving nodes versus number of malicious nodes. The pro cess of identifying 
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malicious nodes is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, techniques such as 
those employed in [50, 31] can be utilized. For the purpose of the simulation, we 
assumed that if a malicious node mi made less than ~ accusations (where N is 
the total number of nodes in the network), there is a probability of 0.50 that a 
given well-behaving node nj will identify mi as being malicious when nj receives an 
accusation message from mi; whereas if mi made more than ~ accusations, there 
is a probability of 0.75 that nj will identify mi as being malicious when nj receives 
mi accusations. 
The simulation attempts to balance the following desires of 'the malicious 
nodes: (a) Prevent the revocation of their certificat es by reducing the weight 
of the accusations of well-behaving nodes through malicious accusations. (b) 
Act in collusion with other mali cio us nodes and cause the revocation of well-
behaving nodes' certificates by maliciously accusing targeted nodes. These two 
eventualities require different approaches. The former is best achieved if each of 
the malicious nodes launches accusation against all of the well-behaving nodes; 
whereas the latter needs conservatism regarding the number of accusations anode 
makes (see Equation (6.1) and (6.2) in Section 6.2). We used the following simple 
heuristic for achieving a balance between these conflicting requirements: When a 
malicious node mi receives a message from a well-behaving node nj, if mi has not 
previously accused nj of misbehavior and mi made less than ~ accusations and 
the output from a random number generator (which outputs 0 or 1) is 0, then mi 
broadcasts an accusation against nj. In other words, there is a 0.50 probability 
that a malicious node mi will accuse a well-behaving node nj of misbehavior 
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whenever mi receives a message from nj; provided that mi has not previously 
accused nj, and mi made less than ~ accusations. If mi however made more than 
~ accusations and aIl else being equal, then the probability that mi launches an 
accusation against nj-when it receives a message from the latter-decreases to 
0.25. On the other hand, when a well-behaving node ni receives an accusation 
message from a malicious node mj, if ni has not previously accused mj, and mj 
made less than ~ accusations, there is a probability of 0.50 that ni broadcasts an 
accusation against mj. Whereas the probability increases to 0.75 if mj made more 
than ~ accusations. Regarding the collusion aspect of the malicious nodes, when 
a malicious node mi receives an accusation against a well-behaving node nj from 
another malicious node, if mi has not previously accused nj of misbehavior, mi 
immediately launches an accusation against nj. In so doing, malicious nodes can 
effectively target non-malicious nodes in attempt to blackmail them and cause the 
revocation of their certificates. 
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Figure 6-3: Simulation results for 100 nodes 
We simulated a MANET environment running destination sequence distance 
vector (DSDV) as the routing protocol, and examined the performance of our 
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certificate revocation scheme when the number of malicious nodes varies from 5 to 
x, where x is less than the revocation quotient threshold (Rr), for Rr values of ~, 
~ and ~ when N (number of nodes) equals to 100, 75 and 50. 
As expected from intuition, the simulation results indicate that generally, as 
the number of malicious nodes increases, a slightly larger number of accusations 
are required to cause the revocation of a malicious node's certificate. The excep-
tion being when Rr equals ~ for larger values of N, as is the case for N equals 
100 (Fig. 6-3) and N equals 75 (Fig. 6-4). Fig. 6-3 for example, shows that when 
Rr equals 25.00, only 26 accusations are necessary to cause the revocation of a 
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malicious node's certificate, irrespect ive of the number of malicious nodes (M) 
present, as M varies from 5 to 24. The lack of influence of the malicious nodes in 
this regard can be attributed to the following: with Rr = ~ and the number of 
malicious nodes being less than Rr, the ratio of well-behaving nodes to malicious 
nodes is higher as the value of N increases. For example, when N equals to 100, 
the ratio of well-behaving nodes to malicious nodes (M) ranges from 19 to 3 when 
M varies from 5 to Rr; whereas when N equals 50, this ratio ranges from 9 to 3 
as M varies from 5 to Rr. For lower Rr values, higher ratio of well-behaving to 
malicious nodes has the effect of diluting the influence of the malicious nodes, since 
sm aller percentages of the available well-behaving nodes are sufficient to cause the 
revocation of a malicious node's certificate. 
Another deviation in the results from what is expected from intuition is the 
higher than average increase in the number of accusations required to revoke a 
certificate when the number of malicious nodes increases from 25 to 30 or from 
20 to 25 for N equals 100 or 75 respectively, when Rr equals If. This can be 
attributed to the accumulative effect of the increasing number of malicious nodes. 
Higher Rr values necessitate larger number of accusations to cause the revocation 
of a certificate. The malicious nodes therefore have more opportunity to accuse 
well-behaving nodes before their certificates are revoked. Consequently for higher 
Rr values, as the number of malicious nodes increases, their effect becomes more 
pronounced. 
In summary, the simulation results indicate that the number of accusations 
in excess of Rr that is necessary to cause the revocation of a malicious node's 
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certificate depends on the size of the network (N) and the value of RT . For lower 
RT values, that is, for RT ::; ~, the effect of increasing number of malicious nodes 
is less pronounced as the size of N increases. However when RT is greater than ~, 
the effect of increasing number of mali cio us nodes is more pronounced for larger 
networks. In this regard, the simulation results show that when RT ::; q., r RT l + 4 
accusations are sufficient to cause the revocation of a malicious node's certificate 
irrespective of the number of malicious nodes (k) in the network, provided that 
k < RT; whereas, when RT > q., as many as r RT l + 10 accusations may be 
required to cause the revocation of a malicious node's certificate. In light of these 
results, it may be advantageous for RT to be less than or equal to ~, provided that 
the number of malicious nodes (k) in the network is expected to be less than this 
value. If the latter cannot be guaranteed, then RT should be increased such that it 
is always greater than k. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A secure MANET routing protocol with resilience against byzantine 
behaviors of malicious or selfish agents 
In this chapter, we present a sec ure on-demand1 multi-path source routing 
protocol, called RSR (Robust Source Routing). 
7.1 Overview of RSR 
RSR has two phases: route discovery and route utilization and maintenance 
phases. We give an overview of each phase below. 
Route discovery 
In the route discovery phase, a source node S broadcasts a route request 
indicating that it needs to find a path from S to a destination node D. In the 
route request, S stipulates that the path it seeks must not contain any node 
which is listed in its tabu list, or any link that appears in its exclusion links list. 
We provide a rationale for the tabu list and exclusion links li st in Section 7.3. 
Additionally, the path must not contain any node which is found in the tabu list 
of an element in the path. Each node through which the route request traverses 
is required to append its identifier and its tabu list to the appropriate field of 
1 On-demand proto cols have been shown ta perform better and have signifi-
cantly lower associated overhead than proactive proto cols [17, 60, 81]. 
101 
the route request, and signs the packet. Therefore, the information regarding the 
identity of the nodes that should be excluded from the path is easily ascertained. 
When the route request packets arrive at the destination node D, D selects three 
valid paths, copy each path to a route reply packet, signs the packets and unicasts 
them to S using the respective reverse paths. S proceeds with the utilization and 
maintenance phase when it receives the route reply packets. 
Route utilization and maintenance 
The source node S selects one of the routing path it acquired during the 
routing discovery phase, and sends the data traffic. The destination node D is 
required to send a signed acknowledgment for each data frame it receives. If S 
does not get an acknowledgment from D for a data frame after a given number 
of retries; and it does not receive a link-layer error message indicating that the 
destination D is unreachable, S assumes that there are selfish or malicious nodes 
on the path and proceeds as follows: S constructs and sends a forerunner packet to 
inform the nodes on the path that they should expect a specified amount of data 
from the source of the packet within a given time. Wh en the forerunner packet 
reaches the destination, it sends an acknowledgment to S. If S does not receive 
an acknowledgment for the forerunner packet, it proceeds as outlined in Section 
7.3.2, under the heading "No ACK for a FR packet returns from D." Otherwise, 
S commences the data traffic flow to D. If there are selfish or malicious agents 
in the path and they choose to drop the data packet or acknowledgment from D, 
such eventuality is dealt with as outlined in Section 7.3.2, under the heading "S 
commenced data flow to D but the traffic is being dropped." 
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7.2 Problem definition and model 
In this section we outline the network and security assumptions we utilized in 
the design of RSR. We also present a more precise description of the problem our 
proto col addresses. 
7.2.1 Network assumptions 
RSR utilizes the following assumptions regarding the targeted MANETs: 
• Each node has a unique identifier (IP address, MAC address or certificate 
seriaI number). 
• Each node has a valid certificate and the public keys of the CAs which issued 
the certificates of the other network peers. 
• The wireless communication links between the nodes are symmetric; that 
is, if node ni is in the transmission range of node nj, then nj is also in the 
transmission range of ni. This is typically the case with most 802.11 [54] 
compliant network interfaces. 
• The link-Iayer of the MANET nodes provide transmission error detection 
service. This is a common feature of most 802.11 wireless interfaces. 
• Any given intermediate node on a path from a source to a destination may 
be malicious and therefore cannot be fully trusted. The source node only 
trusts a destination node, and visa versa, a destination node only trusts a 
source node. 
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7.2.2 Threat model 
In this work, we do not assume the existence of security association between 
any pair of nodes. Sorne previous works, for example [91, 47] rely on the assump-
tion that protocols such as the well known DifRe-Hellman key exchange proto col 
[28] can be used to establish secret shared keys on communicating peers. How-
ever, in an adversarial environment, malicious entities can easily disrupt these 
protocols-and prevent nodes from establishing shared keys with other nodes-by 
sim ply dropping the key exchange proto col messages, rather than forwarding 
them. Our threat model does not place any particular limitations on adversarial 
entities. Adversarial entities can intercept, modify or fabricate packets; create 
routing loops; selectively drop packets; artificially delay packets; or attempt denial 
of service attacks by injecting packets in the network with the goal of consuming 
network resources. Malicious entities can also collude with other malicious entities 
in attempts to hide their adversarial behaviors. The goal of our protocol is to 
detect selfish or adversarial activities and mitigates against them. 
One particular type of attacks our proto col cannot prevent is wormhole 
exploits [48]. In wormhole attacks, an attacker receives packets at one point in a 
network, tunnel them to another point in the network and replays them into the 
network from that point. Colluding adversaries can use this attack, for example to 
forward route request packets in attempt to increase the likelihood of adversarial 
entities controlling routing paths. If a wormhole exhibits adversarial activities, our 
proto col mitigates against these exploits by treating the wormhole as a single link 
and make efforts to avoid utilizing it. 
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7.2.3 Problem definition 
Our goal in this work is to provide a robust on-demand secure routing 
proto col which operates under the assumption listed in Section 7.2.1 and mitigates 
against any of the possible adversarial activities outlined in the threat model 
in Section 7.2.2. The explicit aim of the proto col is not to eliminate adversarial 
activities-since it is virtually impossible to prevent sorne of these activities-
rather, the objective is to discourage selfishness and lessen the effects of the 
adversarial activities indicated in the threat model. 
7.3 Details of RSR 
The proto col requires each node to keep a tabu list containing a list of nodes 
which the owner of the li st deems malicious or untrustworthy. The owner of the 
list will silently drop route request packets originated from any node that is in its 
tabu list. It is therefore highly likely that the owner of a tabu list will be listed in 
the tabu lists of the nodes in its tabu list. Hence, it is within a node's best interest 
to add anode to its tabu list only if it has a high degree of certainty that the 
given node is malicious or untrustworthy. 
As previously indicated, the routing scheme consists of two phases: route 
discovery and route utilization and maintenance phases. AlI unicast routing 
packets transmitted in each phase of the proto col have a common source route 
header with the following fields: 
• Source address: The identifier of the node which constructed the packet . 
• Destination address: The identifier of the destination node. 
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• Source route: The routing path the packet must traverse in transit from the 
source to the destination. 
7.3.1 Route discovery 
When a node ni has data to transmit to a destination which it does not know 
of a path to, ni generates a route request (RREQ) packet containing the following 
information: 
• Request id: A unique, random nonce, which together with the source address 
serves as the identifier of a RREQ packet. 
• Exclusion links: A list of zero or more link(s) which must not be included on 
a path. 
• Route record: The list of nodes the RREQ traverses, along with their tabu 
lists and accompanying signatures. 
It should be noted that exclusion links and the tabu lists are separate entities 
which serve different purposes, namely: when anode nj is listed in node ni 's 
tabu list, ni will silently drop RREQ packets originated from nj. If ni is currently 
on any of nj 's routing paths, it will continue to forward data traffic along the 
given path(s); however, ni will not appear on any new path for nj since it will 
not forward any other RREQ packets from nj. On the other hand, if nj appears 
on a link in ni 's exclusion links, ni will still continue to forward RREQ packets 
originated from nj; since ni does not know whether it is nj or nk (the other node 
in the problematic link) that is the selfish or adversarial node. 
After generating the RREQ, ni signs the RREQ and broadcasts the packet 
to its neighbors. When anode nj receives a set of RREQ packet-it has not 
106 
previously seen-with the same (source address, request id) identifier, it selects one 
at random2 then checks if any of the following holds: 
• The source of the RREQ is listed in nj 's tabu list. 
• nj appears in a tabu lists in the route record field. 
• There is an exclusion link between nj and a neighbor which appears in the 
route record field. 
If any of the above holds, nj dis cards the packet and records that it has seen a 
RREQ with the given (source address, request id) identifier. Otherwise, nj verifies 
the initiator's signatureS; if the verification fails and nj's link-layer does not 
report a transmission error, nj adds the neighbor it received the RREQ packet 
from to its tabu list and discards the RREQ. The reason being, nj 's neighbor 
either modified or fabricated the packet, or it did not verify the source's signature 
before forwarding the RREQ; that is, nj 's neighbor is either malicious or it is not 
complying with the protocol. If the signature verification succeeds, nj appends its 
identifier and its tabu list to the route record field, signs the entire route record 
field, makes a record indicating that it has seen a RREQ packets with the given 
(source address, request id) identifier, and broadcasts the packet to its neighbors. 
2 Selecting an RREQ packet at random rather than choosing the first one that 
arrives provides protection against rushing attack [49J. 
3 Source authentication is utilized to extenuate the effect of denial of service 
attacks on the network. We discuss the pros and cons of this approach in Section 
7.4. 
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RREQ packets continue to traverse the network in the manner described 
above until one or more reach the destination node D. On receiving a list of 
RREQ packets with the same (source address, request id) identifier, node D 
is expected to select three of the RREQ packets such that the path in their 
respective route record field has the least number of hops, and no element in the 
path appears in any of the other path elements' tabu lists and no link is listed in 
source's exclusion links. Next, D is required to verify the signatures in the route 
record fields of each of the selected RREQ packets. If the signatures of a selected 
RREQ packet are aU valid, D constructs a route reply (RREP) packet for the 
given RREQ, signs it and unicasts it-using the reverse path in the RREQ route 
record field-to the source of the RREQ. If any of the signature verification for 
a selected RREQ packet fails, the RREQ in question is discarded and another 
selected using the criteria outline above. The source node S is expected to 
send a signed acknowledgment for each RREP it receives. If D does not get an 
acknowledgment from S for a RREP packet after a given number of retries; if there 
are other RREQ packets remaining, D selects another, pro cesses it as outlined 
above and sends the resulted RREP packet to S. 
In addition to the corn mon source route header, a RREP packet contains the 
foUowing information: 
• Request id: Request id of the corresponding RREQ packet. 
• Path: The identifiers of the nodes in the routing path, in the order indicated 
in the route record field of the corresponding RREQ. 
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When the source of the RREQ receives the RREP packets, it proceeds with the 
route utilization and maintenance as indicated below. 
7.3.2 Route utilization and maintenance 
On receiving the RREP packets, the source node S stores the paths, selects 
one which has the least number of hops, and proceeds to send the data traffic. The 
destination no de (D) is required to send a signed acknowledgment (ACK) for each 
data frame it received. If S does not received a valid ACK for any given data after 
a certain number of retries, nor does S received a link-Iayer error message from any 
of the intermediate nodes; S assumes that there is/are selfish or malicious node(s) 
on the given path, and proceeds with the fault detection and isolation phase below. 
Fault detection and isolation 
When there is evidence of misbehaving node(s) on a given path, the protocol 
utilizes a forerunner (FR) packet to inform the nodes on the path that they should 
expect a certain data fiow rate from S to a specified destination. The intention 
being that if any of the path elements do not receive the specified data traffic 
within a configurable time period after receiving a FR packet from S, it will send 
a negative acknowledgment, informing S that it did not receive the expected data 
fiow. Data fiow rate can be obtained from IEEE 802.11 MAC (Medium Access 
Control) protocol operating in the DCF (Distributed Coordination Function) 
mode, using mechanisms outlined in [22, 107, 66]. 
A forerunner (FR) packet has the following fields: 
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• FR id: A unique, random nonce, which together with the source address 
(ascertained from the source route header) serves as the identifier of a FR 
packet. 
• Expected data rate: data flow rate which should follow the FR packet. 
• ACK indicator: This is al-bit flag which is set if the intermediate nodes are 
required to send a signed ACK back to the source of the FR packet. 
To avoid unnecessary network traffic, the ACK indicator flag is set to 0 when 
a FR packet is constructed. The packet is then signed and sent to D using the 
selected path. When an intermediate node on the path from S to D receives the 
FR packet, it is expected to verify the signature, if it is valid, it should note the 
time it received the FR packet then forward the packet to the next hop on the 
path. When D receives a valid FR packet, it sends a signed ACK back to the 
source. On receiving the ACK from D, S commences the traffic flow to D. 
Selfish or malicious nodes may choose not to forward a FR packet, and they 
also may not forward data traffic after S commences the traffic flow to D. The 
protocol deals with these eventualities as indicated below: 
No ACK for a FR packet returns from D 
If S does not receive an ACK for a FR packet from D, nor does S received 
a link-layer error message from any of the intermediate nodes indicating that the 
destination D is unreachable; S assumes that a misbehaving node on the given 
path has dropped the FR packet or the ACK from D, and proceeds as follows: if 
the length of the path from S to D is exactly 3, S adds the link between D and 
the intermediate node to its exclusion links, discards the path, selects another 
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path to D-if one is available-and repeats the route utilization pro cess indicated 
ab ove. If there are no more precomputed path to D, S constructs, signs and 
broadcasts another RREQ packet with the exclusion link field containing aH the 
problematic link(s) it has recorded. If the path length from S to D is greater than 
3, S constructs another FR packet, sets the ACK indicator flag to 1, signs the 
packet and sends it to the first hop on the path to D. When a node ni receives a 
FR packet with the ACK indicator flag set to 1, ni is expected to broadcast-via 
limited flooding-a signed ACK back to S. In the limited flooding broadcast, 
the time-to-live (TTL) field of the IP header is set to d where dis the number 
of hops from the node in question to S. If S does not receive a valid ACK from 
each of the nodes in the path, then the link between the first node ni-on the 
given path, from which S does not receive a valid ACK-and ni's upstream path 
neighbor is added to S exclusion links. For example, in Fig. 7-1, if S receives 
ACKs for the FR packet from n1 and n2 but not from n3, S would add the link 
between n2 and n3 to its exclusion links, selects another path to D or sends 
out a route request as outlined above. A path with a problematic link can be 
0 ___ 
s ~I--O~O 0 o n2 0 
o 0 O~D 
n3 0 
Figure 7-1: A routing path example 
pruned by removing the sub-path commencing with the downstream node of the 
problematic link. For example, in Fig. 7-1, n3 and D would be removed from 
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the path; resulting in a sub-path of length 3 from S to n2. The resulted sub-path 
after the pruning operation is stored if its length is greater than or equal to 3, or 
discarded otherwise. 
S commenced data flow to D but the traffic is being dropped 
As indicated above, when a node ni receives a FR packet, it records the 
time it received the packet. If a configurable time period (which depends on the 
network latency and available bandwidth) passed and ni does not receive the 
expected data fiow from S to D, ni is required to send-via limited fiooding-a 
signed negative ACK to S, indicating that ni has not received the data fiow it 
expects from S. A negative ACK is similar to an ACK packet, except that it 
informs the intended recipient S that the source of the negative ACK did not 
receive the data traffic it expected from S. When S receives a valid negative ACK 
from a node ni, and it is confirmed by other negative ACKs from downstream 
nodes on the path to D, S records the link between ni and ni 's upstream path 
neighbor as being problematic; S then prunes the given path and repeat the 
pro cess of selecting or discovering another path, as outlined above. 
Rather than dropping data traffic, malicious nodes may choose to tamper 
with the data. The proto col deals with this eventuality by requiring intermediate 
nodes to verify the source's signature on packets they received, before forwarding 
them. If the signature verification fails for node ni, and ni link-layer does not 
report a transmission error, ni is required to add the neighboring node it received 
the packet from to its tabu list, and sends-via limited flooding-a negative ACK 
to S, informing it that the packet has been modified. On receiving the negative 
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acknowledgment from ni, S is expected to append the link involving ni and its 
upstream neighbor to its exclusion links, and prunes the path. 
7.4 Discussion 
In this section, we elaborate on relevant design choices of our protocol. We 
commence with our choice of using digital signatures for integrity checks and 
source authentication. 
7.4.1 Choice of cryptographie tools 
Most network security schemes utilize message authentication codes, rather 
than digital signatures, for integrity checks. This is so due to the fact that message 
authentication codes can be computed much more efficiently than digital signature 
computations. The drawback for the use of message authentication codes, as is the 
case for other symmetric-key cryptographie tools, is that it requires shared keys 
to be established among the communicating peers. As alluded to in Section 7.2.3, 
our protocol was specifically designed for adversarial MANET environments which 
contain, or is likely to contain persistent malicious or selfish entities which seek 
to disrupt the network by perpetrating the adversarial activities outlined in the 
threat mode} in Section 7.2.2. We argue that it may not be feasible to establish 
shared keys among communicating peers, using key exchange protocols, since 
adversarial entities can easily thwart these proto cols by dropping the proto col 
messages, rather than forwarding them. Anode Scan generate a symmetric 
key, signs it, encrypts it with the public key of the intended recipient and sends 
it via broadcast to the destination D. This will likely allow a shared key to be 
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established between Sand D; however the cost in throughput reduction, due to 
the extra broadcast messages, may not justify this approach. Alternatively, shared 
secret keys can be distributed to the network nodes using appropriate out-of-band 
means; again, this approach is not feasible considering the likelihood of shared keys 
being compromised if they are not refreshed frequently. 
Aside from the problem of establishing shared secret keys among communi-
cating peers in highly adversarial environments, message authentication codes may 
not be as effective in identifying certain mali cio us activities. For example, a mali-
cious entity, on a routing path from S to D, which seeks to disrupt the traffic flow 
on this path, can choose to illicitly modify packets and forward them rather than 
mere dropping the packets. The end result of these activities is similar to packet 
dropping since the destination will discard the packets when it ascertains that they 
have been illicitly modified. Digital signature can be used to identify malicious 
entity which modified the packet, or identify the colluding malicious entity which 
forwarded the modified packet; but message authentication code is lacking is this 
regards, since typically only the source and the destination of a traffic flow know 
the secret key for computing the message authentication codes. We leveraged the 
aforementioned feature of digital signature in the design of RSR to help to detect 
and isolate adversarial entities. RSR source authentication operations serves two 
main purposes: 
1. Consider for example the scenario shown in Fig. 7-1. If n3 (a well-behaving 
node) receives a packet from n2 to forward to D, if the signature verification 
for the packet fails and n3 link-layer does not report a transmission error, n3 
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will add n2 to its tabu list. The reason being, either n2 modified the packet 
or it did not verify the signature on the packet; that is, n2 is either malicious 
or it is not complying with the protocol. In addition to adding n2 to its 
tabu list, n3 will discard the packet and send a negative acknowledgment to 
S informing it that the packet it received has been illegitimately modified. 
If this info from n3 is supported by the fact that S does not receive an 
acknowledgment from D for the given data frame, S will add the link 
between n2 and n3 to its exclusion links and consequently commences the 
pro cess of isolating n2. 
2. Source authentication can also be use to attenuate certain denial of service 
exploits. Malicious nodes may attempt to flood the network with fabricated 
packets in attempts to consume network resources. RSR source authenti-
cation operations are partly aimed at reducing the effect of these types of 
attacks by stipulating that nodes discard unauthenticated packets. It should 
be noted that adversarial entities can overwhelm individual nodes in their 
one-hop neighborhood by sending them large number of fabricated packets. 
However, the fact that the unauthenticated packets will be discarded, the 
resource consumption exploit will be limited to the one-hop neighborhood of 
the adversarial entities. 
In light of the above possibilities, it is our view that the benefits of using digital 
signature for source authentication outweighs the associated cost. Digital signature 
schemes such as RSA [103J allow trade-off between signing and verification 
operations. If the public exponent of the crypto system is small, verification can 
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be several times faster then signing operations. Example, for a 1024-bit RSA key, 
if the public exponent (e) is 3, verification operations can be over 700 times faster 
than signing operations [119J. Verification of signatures can therefore be do ne 
fairly efficiently; most of the digital signature operations in RSR are verification 
activities. 
An alternative approach to utilizing cryptographie tools for the operations 
outlined in item 1 ab ove , is to have the nodes' network interfaces operate in 
promiscuous mode and stipulate that the nodes monitor the traffic that fiows in 
and out of each of their neighbors, and report aH discrepancies. This operation 
however is inefficient and is subjected to the short comings outlined in Section 
5.1.3 for Marti et al scheme [82J. 
7.4.2 Tabu list and exclusion links 
RSR utilizes tabu lists and exclusion links to record problematic nodes and 
links, respectively. The consequences of being listed in a node's tabu list is more 
severe for the following reasons: a node will silently discard route requests from 
nodes which are listed in its tabu list. Therefore, if anode is listed in the tabu 
lists of several nodes, it will likely have much difficulties communicating with 
other nodes which are not in its transmission range. On the other hand, a node's 
exclusion links list is used solely to exclude problematic links from its routing 
paths. This design choice is motivated by the fact that a node ni does not know 
for sure which element of a problematic link is selfish or adversarial; and ni wants 
to avoid the possible of wrongfully isolating well-behaving nodes. Malicious nodes 
may add well-behaving nodes to their tabu list with the intention of disrupting 
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route discovery processeSj however, this eventuality would actually have positive 
effects on the network, since this reduces the possibility of the given malicious 
nodes being on routing paths. Similarly, adversarial entities will not achieve any 
benefit from adding functionallinks to their exclusion links lists. 
7.4.3 Forerunner packets mechanism 
Our Forerunner (FR) packet mechanism requires MANET node to be able 
to determine the fiow rate of incoming traffic. As outlined in Section 7.3.2, data 
fiow rate can be obtained from IEEE 802.11 MAC proto col quite efficiently using· 
techniques presented in [22, 107, 66]. The distinguishing feature of our forerunner 
(FR) packets mechanism compare to other MANET fault detection techniques-
such as probing-is the following: FR packets inform the nodes on a path from a 
source node S to a destination node D that S intends to send a certain amount of 
data within a given time periodj therefore the nodes should expect the specified 
data traffic fiow rate from S for the time period indicated. If the nodes on the 
path from S to D do not receive the specified data traffic fiow rate within the 
specified time period, they are required to send negative acknowledgments to S 
informing S that they did not receive the expected data fiow. This mechanism 
forces selfish or malicious entities on routing paths to cooperate and forward 
the specified data traffic a FR packet announced would follow, or risk being 
identified as problematic if they choose not to forward the data traffic. The 
selfish or malicious entities can resume adversarial activities after forwarding the 
specified data traffie a FR paeket announeed. However, the end result is that FR 
packets can force uncooperative entities to forward specified amount of data; or 
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conversely, help to identify links which contains uncooperative nodes. This can 
be contrasted with schemes such as [6, 63, 65J which utilize probing techniques, 
in that the probing mechanisms will succeed in enforcing cooperation only if 
the probing packets are completely indistinguishable from other data packets; 
which in reality is very difficult to achieve. There are no needs for FR packets 
to be indistinguishable from other packets since their purpose is to announce 
intended traffic fiows. Adversarial entities can choose to drop FR packets; however 
as outlined Section 7.3.2 and 7.5, the protocol operations provides means for 
identifying these adversarial activities. 
7.5 Analysis 
In this section we give specific examples of malicious behaviors and show how 
RSR mitigates against these possible exploits. 
7.5.1 A single malicious node on a routing path 
o 0 
s~o~.~o 0 
o nI m 0 
o 0 0------D 
n2 0 
Figure 7-2: One malicious node on a routing path 
Consider the following with respect to the routing path depicted in Fig. 7-2: 
1. If m drops a data packet sent from S to D, S would not receive an ACK 
from D for the given packet. Consequently, S sends a FR packet along the 
path to D. If m drops this packet, no acknowledgment will return from D 
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for the FR packet. S will then send a FR packet with the ACK indicator bit 
set to 1, along the same path to D. Each node along the path that receives 
the FR packet (with the ACK indicator bit set to 1) is required to send-via 
limited flooding-a sign ACK to S. If m drops this packet, S will not receive 
an ACK from n2. Therefore, S will classify the link between m and n2 as 
problematic and adds it to its exclusion links. The next RREQ packet S 
sends out will contain information about the faulty link between m and n2. 
When n2 receives this info, if there were at least N - 1 (see Section 7.4.2 for 
info related to N) other RREQ packets from different sources which listed 
this link as problematic, n2 will add m to its tabu list; thus initiating the 
pro cess of isolating m. 
2. If m acknowledges and forwards the FR packets with the ACK indicator bit 
set to 1, but succeeded-with the help of other malicious nodes outside the 
given path-to filter out the ACKs sent by n2 and D to S, S will not get 
an ACK from n2. Therefore, S will add the link between m and n2 to its 
exclusion links. 
3. If S receives an ACK for the FR packet (with the ACK indicator bit set 
to 1) from each of the path element, S will start sending the specified data 
traffic to D. If m drops a data frame, n2 and D would not receive the data 
flow the FR packet specified that they should expect. Consequently, they will 
send a negative ACK-via limited flooding-to S. When S gets the negative 
ACKs, S adds the link between m and n2 to its exclusion link. 
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4. If m with the help of other malicious nodes outside the given path, succeeds 
in filtering out the negative ACKs from n2 and D, S will know that the path 
has a fault, since it does not receive an ACK from D for the data frame m 
dropped. Consequently, S will discard the given path. The same ho Ids if m 
forwards aIl the data frames from S to D but drops an ACK D sends to S. 
7.5.2 Colluding malicious nodes adjacent to each other 
000 S~o~. 0 0 
o nI m~ 0 
o 0 O~~D 
o m2 0 
Figure 7-3: Adjacent colluding malicious nodes on a routing path 
Consider the path shown in Fig. 7-3 with the colluding malicious node ml 
and m2. If ml or m2 drops packets they are required to forward, It is trivial to 
show that the same arguments outlined in 1), 2), 3) and 4) above hold. 
7.5.3 Colluding malicious nodes 2 hops away from each other 
o 0 0 0 s~~O~O 0 
nI 0 
o 0 0 .~D 
m2 0 o 
Figure 7-4: Non-adjacent colluding malicious nodes on a routing path 
In the path shown if Fig. 7-3, if ml or m2 drops packets that were intended 
to be forwarded to D, it can also be trivially shown that the arguments outlined in 
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1), 2) and 3) above hold. In this scenario, however, it is unlikely that ml will ever 
succeed-with the help of other malicious nodes outside the given path-in filter 
out negative ACKs sent via limited flooding from nI to 5, unless aIl of the nodes 
that are within 5 transmission range are malicious. It will therefore be difficult for 
ml to conceal its malicious behaviors. 
7.6 Simulation evaluation 
We implemented RSR in NS2 network simulator [1]. For the cryptographie 
components, we utilized Cryptlib crypto toolkit [43J to generate 1024-bit RSA 
cryptographie keys for the signing and verification operations. In the simulation 
implementation, malicious nodes do not comply with the protocol. For example, 
they do not verify the signatures on the packets they forward, nor do they add 
nodes to their tabu list or exclusion links, or send negative ACKs. In addition, 
they selectively drop or modify packets they are asked to forward. The exception 
being that they do not drop or modify RREQ or RREP packets, since their 
adversarial effects are more pronounced when they are on as many routing paths 
as possible. Table 7-1 summaries the simulation parameters. 
7.6.1 Performance metrÏcs 
We used the following met ries to evaluate the performance of our scheme. 
1. Packet Delivery Ratio: This is the fraction of data packets generated by 
CBR (Constant Bit Rate) sources that are delivered to the destinations. This 
evaluates the ability of RSR to deliver data packets to their destinations in 
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Table 7-1: Simulation parameters values 
Parameter 
Space 
N umber of nodes 
Mobility model 
Speed 
Pause time 
Traffic type 
Max number of connections 
Packet size 
Packet generation rate 
Simulation time 
Value 
670 m x 670 m 
50 
random waypoint 
20 mis 
600 s 
CBR 
34 
512 bytes 
4 packets/s 
170 s 
the presence of varying number of malicious agents which selectively drop 
packets they are required to forward. 
2. Number of data packets delivered: This metric gives additional insight 
regarding the effectiveness of the scheme in delivering packets to their 
destination in the presence of varying number of adversarial entities. 
3. Routing Overhead (bytes): This is the total number of bytes of routing 
control messages generated over the length of the simulation. 
4. Routing Overhead (packets): This is the total number of routing control 
messages generated over the length of the simulation. We normalized the 
routing overhead by the number of packets sent and the number of packets 
received, to compensate for the fact that in the simulation implementation 
adversarial nodes do not sent data packets. 
5. Average end-to-end latency of the data packets: This is the ratio of 
the total time it takes aU packets to reach their respective destinations and 
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Figure 7-6: Number of packets received over the Length of the simulation 
the total number of packets received. This measures the average delays of aU 
packets which were successfuUy transmitted. 
The results of the simulation for RSR is compared to that of DSR [61], which 
currently is perhaps the most widely used MANET source routing proto col. 
7.6.2 Simulation results 
The simulation results confirm that RSR is very effective in delivering data 
packets to their intended destinations even in the presence of large proportion of 
malicious entities. As indicated in Fig. 7-5, RSR was able to maintain delivery 
ratio of over 0.8 even when 80 percent of the nodes are malicious. Whereas the 
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Figure 7-8: Routing overhead (bytes) normalized by number of data packets re-
ceived 
delivery ratio for DSR was 0.2 when 70 percent of the nodes are malicious and 0 
when 80 percent of the nodes are malicious. 
It should be noted that DSR does not provide any security services, nar does 
it provide reliable data transfer; whereas RSR provide both of these features. It 
is therefore expected that the overhead associated with RSR will be significantly 
higher than DSR. This is the trade-off relating to the overhead of the two pro-
tocols. In spite of the higher overhead associated with RSR, Fig. 7-6 indicates 
that over the length of the simulation, RSR on average, delivers more than twice 
the number of packets DSR delivers when the percentage of malicious nodes in 
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packets received 
the network is greater than 10. This confirms-as the plot of delivery ratio (Fig. 
7-5) indicates-that in the presence of active malicious entities, RSR allows much 
greater throughput than DSR. 
RSR employs digital signature to provide data origin authentication and 
integrity checks. In the RSR simulation implementation, each routing packet is 
signed and the signature appended to the packetj therefore RSR packets are much 
larger than that of DSR. As expected, the simulation results indicate that the 
routing overhead for RSR, an average, increases as the percentage of malicious 
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Figure 7-11: Average data packet latency (8) 
nodes increases. This is due to the following: as malicious activities increase, 
more FR packets and consequently ACKs for FR packets, and negative ACKs 
are sent. Figs 7-7, 7-8, 7-9 and 7-10 indicate that the trends are similar whether 
the overhead in terms of bytes or packets generated is normalized by number of 
packets sent or number of packets received. 
Fig 7-11 shows that there are no clear trends regarding average data packet 
latency. The fluctuation in data packet latency is likely related to the number of 
broadcast packets circulating in the network. The higher the number of broadcast 
packets in the network, the more contention there will be for the wireless access 
medium; and consequently, the longer it will take for packets to be delivered 
to their respective destinations. Average data packet latency is also inversely 
related to data packet size: larger packets, on average, take longer to reach their 
destinations. Hence, the higher average packet latency for R8R compared to D8R 
is expected. However this increase in latency is insignificant compared to the 
proportionally higher throughput that R8R provides in the presence of increased 
number of active malicious entities. 
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One result that is unexpected for RSR is the decrease in overhead when the 
percentage of malicious nodes increases from 60 to 70 as indicated in Figs 7-7, 
7-8, 7-9 and 7-10. This trend is likely related to the CBR traffic pattern during 
this time interval in the simulation. One possibility is that the CBR data packets 
sent-during this time interval in the simulation-traverse fewer malicious nodes; 
consequently there may have been a slight decreased in malicious activities during 
this time interval. 
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8.1 Summary 
CHAPTER8 
Conclusion 
In Chapter two we noted that the security solutions proposed for addressing 
access control, authentication, integrity and confidentially services for MANETs, 
utilize one or more of the following cryptographie technologies: symmetric-key 
cryptography, digital certificates and threshold cryptography. We then gave brief 
descriptions of the IEEE 802.11 related security standards (WEP, TKIP and 
CCMP) and other symmetric-key based MANET security schemes. Following this, 
we presented a brief history of digital certificates, highlighted the distinguishing 
features of the four main types of digital certificates currently in use, and cate-
gorized the existing MANET security proposaIs which utilize digital certificates. 
We grouped these proposaIs into two main categories: schemes which have no 
preference for digital certificate type, and schemes which require PGP certificate 
type. We subdivided the group of schemes which have no preference for digital 
certificate type, into three categories: schemes which do not address certificate 
revocation, schemes which require access to trusted third party, and schemes which 
do not require access to trusted third party. Following the presentation related 
to digital certificates, we described the operations of (k, N) threshold schemes, 
verifiable secret sharing, proactive secret sharing and identity-based cryptography; 
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then we reviewed the existing MANET security proposaIs which utilize threshold 
cryptography. 
In Chapter four we highlighted the pros and cons of the above-mentioned 
cryptographic technologies. We noted that security schemes which are based solely 
on symmetric key cryptography are less robust and offer lower degree of security, 
owing to key management issues associated with shared secret keys. Following this, 
we discussed the hierarchical and Web-of-trust trust models and argued that the 
Web-of-trust model is more susceptible to infiltration of malicious agents; therefore 
schemes which utilize this trust model are not suit able for MANET environments 
with high security requirements. Next, we highlighted the challenges of utilizing 
certificates based on hierarchical trust model in MANETs. One of the foremost 
challenge is the issue certificate revocation in MANETs where there are no on-line 
access to trusted authorities. We noted that only one of the digital certificate 
based proposaIs we reviewed in Chapter two ad dresses certificate revocation 
and do es not rely on the assumption that access to on-line CAs is available. 
This scheme however does not provide protection against certificates being 
wrongfully revoked through malicious accusations. Following the discussion on 
digital certificat es , we analyzed the schemes which employ threshold cryptography 
and argued that these schemes are not suitable for most MANET environments for 
two main reasons: 
1. The computational overhead associated with threshold cryptography is too 
prohibitive for low-powered MANET nodes. 
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2. Threshold cryptographic schemes require unselfish cooperation of the 
network nodes. This requirement is unrealistic in most non-military network 
environments. 
From the above discussion, we assert that the issue of certificate revocation in 
MANETs is an important, open research problem. 
In Chapter five we analyzed the existing sec ure MANET routing proposaIs. 
We noted that most of these proposaIs do not mitigate against selfish or mali cio us 
entities which selectively drop packets they agreed to foreword. We categorized 
the proposaIs which attempt to mitigate against these adversarial activities 
into three categories: trust-based routing schemes, incentive-based schemes and 
schemes which employs detection and isolation mechanisms. We argued that 
trust-based routing schemes are susceptible to adversarial exploits because they 
either require group secret keys to enforce trust-Ievel requirements, they do not 
provide protection against mali cio us accusation attacks, or they can be thwarted 
by dropping the trust query messages. Next we highlighted the point that the 
incentive-based schemes either require tamper resistant hardware module or they 
require on-line access to a centralized entity. Owing to these requirements, the 
incentive-based schemes are limited in their applications. Regarding the schemes 
which employs detection and isolation mechanisms, we asserted that these schemes 
are inadequate for the various reasons outlined in Section 5.1.3. Finally, we 
concluded from the review and analysis of the existing MANET secure routing 
proposaIs, that there are needs for secure routing schemes which adequately 
mitigate against selfishness and selective packet dropping in MANETs. 
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8.2 Original contributions 
This thesis makes two main original contributions: 
1. we present a decentralized certificate revocation scheme for MANET. 
Our scheme delegates aIl key management tasks, except the issuing of 
certificates, to the nodes in a MANET; and it does not require access to 
on-line CAs. Our certificate revocation protocol has relatively low associated 
computational overhead owing to the fact that it mainly uses hash chains 
for the security mechanisms. We present a security analysis in which we 
outline four possible attacks ~alicious entities can launch against our 
certificate revocation protocol and examine how the proto col deals with these 
adversarial activities. We provide communication complexity analysis which 
shows that order N 2 accusation info messages are sufficient to cause the 
revocation of a malicious node's certificate. FinaIly, we present simulation 
results indicating the effectiveness of our certificate revocation proto col in 
revoking the certificates of adversarial entities in such a way that the nodes 
in the network are cognizant of the certificates revocation information in a 
timely manner. 
2. We present a robust, sec ure MANET on-demand routing proto col which 
is capable of delivering packets to their destinations even in the presence 
of large proportions of active malicious or selfish agents which selectively 
drop packets they agreed to forward. We named this proto col Robust Source 
Routing (RSR). RSR introduces the concept of forerunner (FR) packets 
which inform nodes along a path that they should expect specified data flow 
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within a given time frame. The path elements can therefore be on the look 
out for the given data flow, and in the event that they do not receive the 
traffic flow, they can transmit info to the source informing it that the data 
flow they expected did not arrive. In so doing, links with active malicious 
agents can be identified, and the malicious agents be eventually isolated. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that utilizes the concept 
of forerunner packets to encourage cooperation in MANETs. Finally, we 
provide simulation results showing that in the presence of increased number 
of active adversarial nodes, RSR maintains delivery ratios that exceeds those 
associated with DSR by more than 50 percent. Additionally, the simulation 
results indicate that on average, RSR provides throughput that is two fold 
that of DSR, when the percentage of malicious nodes is greater than 10 
percent. 
To highlight the significance of the contribution of RSR, we reproduce the table 
(in Table 8-1) containing the summary of the analysis we gave in Chapter 5, along 
with a brief summary of RSR contributions. 
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Table 8-1: Summary of routing security analysis 
Schemes Comments 
Schemes which SRP [91], SEAD [47], SAODV [127], Ariadne [46], ARAN [105], 
do not address Binkley et al [9] and Venkatraman et al [115] schemes do not 
packet dropping address packet dropping. 
Trust-based SAR [124] requires shared group keys; therefore it is subjected to 
schemes the key management issues outlined in Section 4.1.1. Pirzada et 
al and Nekkanti et al [98, 88] do not provide protection against 
packet dropping; SDAR [16] is subjected to the short comings 
indicated below for Marti et al scheme; Li et al [78] scheme can 
be thwarted by dropping the trust query messages. 
Incentive-based Buttyan et al [18] requires tamper resistant hardware and Zhong 
schemes et al [130] requires on-line access to a centralized entity; there-
fore, these schemes are limited in their applications. 
Schemes which Marti et al [82], in the author's own words, has the following 
employ detection weaknesses: "it might not detect a misbehaving node in the 
and isolation presence of 1) ambiguous collisions, 2) receiver collisions, 3) lim-
mechanisms ited transmission power, 4) false misbehavior, 5) collusion, and 
6) partial dropping." Buchegger et al [104] scheme does not 
provide protection against false accusations. The probing tech-
nique Awerbuch et al, Just et al and Patwardhan et al schemes 
[6, 63, 93] utilize, is ineffective against intelligent adversaries 
which selectively drop packets, since the probing packets are not 
completely indistinguishable from other data packets. 
RSR Uses forerunner packets to encourage cooperation; forerunner 
packets do not need to be indistinguishable from other packets. 
RSR successfullY mitigates against selective packet dropping. 
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